

HEADQUARTERS
1611TH AIR TRANSPORT WING (M), (MATS)
McGuire Air Force Base
Trenton, New Jersey

WIFPS

OUI 1130 13 MAR

SUBJECT: Test Analysis Report on R6D Aircraft #131588

TO: Commander
Naval Aviation Safety Center
Norfolk, Virginia

1. The attached Test Analysis Report is forwarded to you as directed by the Accident Investigation Board which investigated the accident involving R6D #131588 which crashed during a flight from Lakenheath RAF Station, England, to Lajes Field, Azores, on 10 October 1956.
2. No evidence was found to indicate the cause of the accident. The final analysis indicates that a fire or explosion occurred during flight and that the landing gear was extended during the impact with the water.
3. This Technical Note is forwarded to you for your information and inclusion in your files.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

(b) (6)



1 Incl
WADC Technical Note 57-21

Major USAF
Adjutant

1

683

Closed 131588
R&D 10/10/56

HEADQUARTERS
1611TH TECNICAL GROUP
TECHNICAL NOTE
McGuire Air Force Base
Trenton, New Jersey

6 March 1957

SUBJECT: Supplemental Information of Major Aircraft Accident Report R&D
131588 (MATS), dated 10 October 1956.

To: Director, Flight Safety Research, USAF, Norton Air Force
Base, California, (per lla(1), 1 cy)
Commander, Naval Air Transport Squadron Six, McGuire Air Force
Base, Trenton, New Jersey, (per lla(2), 2 cy)
Commander, United States Naval Air Station, Corpus Christi,
Texas, (per lla(5), 1 cy)
Commander, Wright Air Development Center, Wright-Patterson Air
Force Base, Ohio, (per lla(7), 2 cy)
Commander, Naval Aviation Center, Norfolk, Virginia,
(1 cy) 2
Commander, Atlantic Division, USAF, McGuire Air Force Base,
New Jersey, (1 cy)
The Surgeon General, USAF, Headquarters, United States Air
Force, Washington 25, D. C., (per lla(9), 1 cy)
Commander, McGuire Air Force Base, Trenton, New Jersey,
(1 cy)

1. The following information is forwarded in accordance with para-
graph h2, Air Force Regulation 62-11, dated 25 January 1956:

a. On 26 October 1956, a left main landing gear and a twenty
man life raft, recovered from a crashed R&D aircraft, were airlifted to
the Aircraft Laboratory at the Wright Air Development Center, Ohio.
Members of the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board, accompanying the
recovered parts, requested that an analysis be made to determine, if possible,
any additional information in regard to the cause of the accident. The
final analysis indicates that the tire was exposed to flames and subsequently
burned. The life raft was not exposed to flames, and the piston fracture
was caused by an impact with the water in a direction parallel to the air-
craft center line. No evidence was found to indicate the cause of the
accident.

b. In the investigation and analysis section of the Accident
Report dated 6 November 1956, it was stated that the results of this
analysis would be forwarded when received. A call was made on 4 March 1957,
to the aircraft Laboratory to determine distribution of the Technical Note
on the Test Results. Two (2) copies were sent to Norton Air Force Base,
California; two (2) copies were sent to Headquarters, MATS, and one (1) copy
was sent to McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey. Three (3) additional
copies have been requested for distribution to the Naval Aviation Safety Center
at Norfolk, Virginia, and to the Commander, VP-6 Naval Air Transport Squadron,
McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey.

HEADQUARTERS
1611TH AIR TRANSPORT WING (M), (MATS)
McGuire Air Force Base
Trenton, New Jersey

6 November 1956

SUBJECT: Report of Missing Aircraft Involving
R6D #131588

TO: Director, Flight Safety Research, OTIG, USAF,
Norton Air Force Base, California (par 4la(1), 1 cy)
Commander, Naval Air Transport Squadron Six, McGuire Air Force
Base, Trenton, New Jersey, (par 4la(2), 2 cy)
Commander, United States Naval Air Station, Corpus Christi,
Texas, (par 4la(5), 1 cy)
Commander, Wright Air Development Center, Wright-Patterson,
Air Force Base, Ohio, (par 4la(7), 1 cy)
✓ Commander, Naval Aviation Center, Norfolk, Virginia,
(1 cy)
Commander, Atlantic Division, Mats, McGuire Air Force Base,
New Jersey, (1 cy)
The Surgeon General, USAF, Headquarters, United States Air
Force, Washington 25, D.C., (par 4la(9), 14A & 14B only)
Commander, McGuire Air Force Base, Trenton, New Jersey,
(1 cy)

1. Transmitted herewith in accordance with paragraph 4la, AFR
62-14, dated 25 January 1956 is Report of Missing Aircraft involving
R6D type aircraft, serial number 131588, which disappeared on a flight
from Lakenheath RAF Station, England to Lajes Air Base, Azores on 10
October 1956.

2. I concur with the findings and recommendations of the aircraft
accident investigating board. Due to lack of recovered wreckage and
loss of all personnel, it is impossible at this time to make any
recommendations or take any corrective action.

(b) (6)

(b)

1 Incl
Rept of Missing Acft,
R6D #131588

G.B. DANY
Brigadier General USAF
Commander

cc:
COMATS, Andrews AFB,
Wash 25, D.C., (1 cy)
Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics,
Navy Department, Wash 25, D.C.
(1 cy)

I N D E X

AF FORM 114 "REPORT OF AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT"

AF FORM 114A "MEDICAL OFFICERS REPORT OF AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT"

AF FORM 114B "MEDICAL OFFICERS REPORT OF AN INDIVIDUAL INVOLVED IN AN
AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT"

AF FORM 114C "AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE OFFICERS REPORT"

TAB A - STATEMENTS

(b) (6)

A1

A2

A3

A4

A5

A6

A7

A8

A9

A10

A11

A12

A13

A14

A15

A16

A17

B ORDERS APPOINTING ACCIDENT INVESTIGATING BOARD

C DD FORM 175 "AIRCRAFT CLEARANCE"

D DD FORM 365F "WEIGHTS AND BALANCE"

E MESSAGES PERTAINING TO THE ACCIDENT

E1 PRELIMINARY REPORT

E2 SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT

E3 REPORT ON R6D 131588

E4 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS R6D 131588

E5 OUTGOING FROM SOUTH RUISLIP, ENGLAND

E6 OUTGOING FROM MC GUIRE AFB, NJ

E7 OTHER MESSAGES

F WEATHER INFORMATION FILE

- 6 10 10 1 5
- F1 WEATHER PLOTTING CHART 0600Z 10 OCTOBER 1956
F2 WEATHER PLOTTING CHART 1200Z 10 OCTOBER 1956
F3 WEATHER PLOTTING CHART 1800Z 10 OCTOBER 1956
F4 WEATHER PLOTTING CHART 0000Z 11 OCTOBER 1956
F5 4D CHART
F6 AIR WEATHER SERVICE FLIGHT FORECAST CROSS SECTION
G STANDARD FLIGHT PLAN
H FLIGHT PLANNING DATA
I FLIGHT ORDERS
J DIAGRAM SHOWING POSSIBLE SCENE OF ACCIDENT
K MANIFEST
L PHOTOGRAPHS
M ATLD FORM 34D "FLIGHT MONITORING CARD - SOUTH RUISLIP"

REPORT OF AF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT

Use this form in accordance with AF Reg. 62-14 and AF Manual 62-5, "Aircraft Accident Prevention-Investigation-Reporting." Fill in all spaces applicable. If additional space is needed, use additional sheet(s) and identify by proper section letter and subsection number.

Section A—GENERAL INFORMATION

1. PLACE OF ACCIDENT: State, County, nearest town, distance and direction from nearest town. If accident occurred on airport, identify Parts of Aircraft Found At 47° 20' N 120° 42' W												
2. DATE OF ACCIDENT	3. HOUR AND TIME ZONE (Local)	4. DAY DAWN NIGHT DUSK	5. AIRFIELD OF LAST TAKEOFF									
10 Oct 56	Unknown	X	Lakenheath AFB, England									
6. CLEARANCE: (Check all applicable) Cleared from Lakenheath AFB, England	IFR VFR	Local	DD Form 175	Other	Cleared Direct	Cleared Via Airway						
				Cleared to Lejoe AFB, Azores								
7. BASE SUBMITTING REPORT	8. DURATION OF FLIGHT	9. MISSION OF FLIGHT (Use DD Form 78-1)	10. ALTITUDE of aircraft above terrain at collision, fire, airframe failure, bailout, spin, stall, ground occupied									
McGuire AFB, NJ	Unknown	O-1	Unknown									
11. AIRFIELD DATA: Fill in (a) OR (b) AS APPLICABLE. For seaplanes landing on seadrome, fill in length of landing lanes and other data as applicable. Discuss in Section M.												
(a) If accident occurred on airport:												
Length of runway in use	ft.	(b) If accident occurred off airport; elevation of scene of accident										
Heading of runway in use	degrees	Was aircraft taking off, approaching or maneuvering to land? Yes _____ No _____										
Field elevation	ft. MSL	If yes, state airport involved										
Type of runway surface (Check)	If no, state nearest airport suitable for landing this aircraft											
Concrete	Asphalt	For either airport mentioned in (b) above:										
Other (Specify)		State airport type (i. e. AF, A, N, CG, PC, P)										
Wat.	Dry	Distance, airport to accident miles. Heading of runway in use degrees										
12. LIST NUMBERS OF ALL OTHER AIRCRAFT INVOLVED: (File separate Form 14 for each aircraft)												
13. VIOLATIONS: Yes _____ No X If yes, discuss in Section M.												

Section B—AIRCRAFT

1. AIRCRAFT NUMBER	2. TYPE, MODEL, SERIES AND BLOCK NUMBER	3. ASSIGNMENT AND STATUS CODE at time of accident									
130500	B60-1	GT									
(As specified in AFM 65-110)											
4. ORGANIZATION POSSESSING AND REPORTING AIRCRAFT ON AF-110 REPORTS AT TIME OF ACCIDENT											
Major Command	Subcommand or AF	Air Division	Wing	Group	Squadron or Unit	Base					
HAFB	---	ATLD	1611th ATW	---	VR-6	McGuire AFB, NJ					
5. IF AIRCRAFT WAS BEING FERRIED OR DELIVERED INDICATE (Gaining and losing organizations, date of transfer, ultimate destination)											

Section C—PILOT(S) INVOLVED (Flight Crew)

1. OPERATOR (Person at controls at time of accident)											
2. LAST NAME (Dr., Lt. etc.) FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME GRADE COMPONENT SERVICE NUMBER NATIONALITY YR. OF BIRTH											
LAW WILLIAM ALEXANDER LIEUT US (b) (6) 1305 US (b) (6)											
3. POSITION IN AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF ACCIDENT											
Front or Left Seat Rear or Right Seat											
4. ASSIGNED DUTY ON FLIGHT ORDER											
AC X IP P CP Other (Specify)											
5. ASSIGNED ORGANIZATION											
Major Command	Subcommand or AF	Air Division	Wing	Group	Squadron or Unit	Base					
HAFB	---	ATLD	1611th ATW	---	VR-6	McGuire AFB, NJ					
6. ATTACHED ORGANIZATION FOR FLYING											
Major Command	Subcommand or AF	Air Division	Wing	Group	Squadron or Unit	Base					
HAFB	---	ATLD	1611th ATW	---	VR-6	McGuire AFB, NJ					
7. ORIGINAL AERONAUTICAL RATING AND DATE RECEIVED											
8. PRESENT AERONAUTICAL RATING AND DATE RECEIVED											
Type Special Primary NA Date of expiration 11 Mar 1957 Duty NA											
9. OTHER PILOT											
10. LAST NAME (Dr., Lt. etc.) FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME GRADE COMPONENT SERVICE NUMBER NATIONALITY YR. OF BIRTH											
WELLS WILLIAM ALEXANDER LIEUT US (b) (6) 1310 US (b) (6)											
11. POSITION IN AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF ACCIDENT											
Front or Left Seat Rear or Right Seat Other											
12. ASSIGNED DUTY ON FLIGHT ORDER											
AC X IP P X CP Other (Specify)											
13. ASSIGNED ORGANIZATION											
Major Command	Subcommand or AF	Air Division	Wing	Group	Squadron or Unit	Base					
HAFB	---	ATLD	1611th ATW	---	VR-6	McGuire AFB, NJ					
14. ATTACHED ORGANIZATION FOR FLYING											
Major Command	Subcommand or AF	Air Division	Wing	Group	Squadron or Unit	Base					
HAFB	---	ATLD	1611th ATW	---	VR-6	McGuire AFB, NJ					
15. ORIGINAL AERONAUTICAL RATING AND DATE RECEIVED											
16. PRESENT AERONAUTICAL RATING AND DATE RECEIVED											
Type Special Primary NA Date of expiration 1 Apr 1957 Duty NA											
NOTE: IF MORE THAN TWO PILOTS ARE INVOLVED (FLIGHT CREW) REPORT SAME INFORMATION REQUIRED IN SECTION C 2 ON ADDITIONAL SHEET FOR EACH.											

Section D—FLYING EXPERIENCE OF PILOT(S) INVOLVED

1. WAS OPERATOR ON INSTRUMENTS AT TIME
OF ACCIDENT OR IMMEDIATELY BEFORE: Yes No Unknown

If "Yes," check one

Weather Hood

ASSIGNED DUTY ON FLIGHT ORDER	(Complete items 2 through 14 for each crewmember pilot)				
	PILOT (Last Name)	CO-PILOT (Last Name)	INSTR. PILOT (Last Name)	AIRCRAFT CMDR. (Last Name)	STUDENT PILOT (Last Name)
NOTE: List all time to the nearest hour.					
2. Total flying hours (including AF time, student time, and other accredited time)	2070.0	1401.0		6105.0	
3. Total rated 1st pilot and instructor pilot hours, all aircraft	979.0	3116.0		1662.0	
4. Total weather instrument hours	231.0	513.0		806.0	
5. Total 1st pilot and instructor pilot hours this model (F-86, B-50, C-119, etc.)	678.0	120.0		1650.0	
6. Total other (Command, a/c cmdr, co-pilot, radar control pilot) hours this model	361.0	1298.0		976.0	
7. Total 1st pilot and instructor pilot hours this model and series (F-84F, F-86D, etc.)	678.0	120.0		1650.0	
8. Total other (Command, a/c cmdr, co-pilot, radar control pilot) hrs this model and series	361.0	520.0		191.0	
9. Total pilot hours last 90 days	189.0	192.0		191.0	
10. Total 1st pilot and instructor pilot hours last 90 days	51.0	166.0		126.0	
11. Total pilot hours (night) last 90 days	11.0	15.0		73.0	
12. Total pilot hours, weather and hood, last 90 days	22.0	27.0		10.0	
13. Date and duration of last previous flight this model	11.0	11.0		11.0	
14. Date and duration of last previous flight this model and series	11.0	11.0		11.0	

15. INSTRUCTIONS: Attach a copy of AF Form 5 for pilot(s) involved for the previous calendar month, and for month in which the accident occurred, to include the flight on which the accident took place.

Section E—PERSONNEL INVOLVED

(Including operator and all other persons, whether in plane or not)

Duty at time of accident <input type="checkbox"/> [1]	Name (Last name first, Grade, Serial Number and Component or Service) <input type="checkbox"/> [2]	Type Aero Rating <input type="checkbox"/> [3]	ORGANIZATIONAL ASSIGNMENT Command, Subcommand, Group Number and Type, Base <input type="checkbox"/> [4]	Injury Class. (or missing) <input type="checkbox"/> [5]	Parachute Used <input type="checkbox"/> Yes [6] <input type="checkbox"/> No [7]	Ejection Seat Used <input type="checkbox"/> Yes [8] <input type="checkbox"/> No [9]
See Attachment #1						

NOTE: If additional space is required to list all personnel involved, attach additional sheet.

Section F—WEATHER

(At time and place of accident)

Ceiling <input type="checkbox"/> Unk.	Visibility <input type="checkbox"/> Unk.	Wind Direction and Velocity <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown	Temperature <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown	Dew Point <input type="checkbox"/> Unk.	Alt. Setting <input type="checkbox"/> Unk.	Other Weather Conditions <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown
--	---	---	---	--	---	--

If weather, including wind conditions, was a factor in the accident, attach statement of weather officer.

Section G—ENGINEERING DATA

1. Damage: (Check one) Destroyed Substantial Minor None 2. Was aircraft damaged beyond economical repair? Yes No
3. Estimated number of direct manhours for repair, if applicable N/A Cost of damage to aircraft
4. Fire before accident after accident Fire did not occur 5. Did explosion occur? Yes No Unknown
6. How many T.O.s not complied with at time of accident? N/A (List T.O. numbers and titles on separate sheet)
7. Has your Base previously submitted a UR on any factor involved in this accident? Yes No
8. Is a UR being submitted as a result of this accident? Yes No (If "Yes" attach copy) UR number _____
9. Is TDR requested? Yes No Attach copy of request

Section H—DAMAGE

DESCRIBE BRIEFLY EXTENT OF DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT AND ANY PROPERTY DAMAGE INCURRED.

Destroyed

Section I—PHASE OF OPERATION <small>(Check only ONE)</small>		Section J—ACCIDENT TYPE		Section K—CONDITIONS AFFECTING ACCIDENT
ENGINES RUNNING—NOT TAXIING	P S	Check one accident type as "Primary." Check all others applicable as "Secondary."		<small>(Check all applicable)</small>
Pre-flight		Ground or water loop		Immediate forced landing
Post flight		Wing-tip landing		Precautionary landing
Other		Wheels-up landing		Fuel exhaustion or starvation
TAXIING		Hard landing		Engine stoppage or flameout
To takeoff		Collapse or retraction of gear		Lost or inaccurate navigation
From landing		Undershoot		Pertinent T.O.s not complied with
Within other area		Overshoot		Simulated emergency
TAKEOFF		Nose-up or nose-over		Ditching (intentional and controlled)
Run		Collision with other aircraft		Accidents in water (other than ditching)
Climb		Collision with ground or water		Explosive decompression
Discontinued (aborted takeoff)		Collisions—Other		Intentional damage to avoid greater hazard
X IN FLIGHT		Spin		GCA, ILAS or range approach used
Normal flight		Stall		Exceeded mach or near mach
Acrobatics		Fire and/or explosion on ground		Compressibility
Formation tactics		Fire and/or explosion in the air		Gear failed to extend
Other maneuvers		Airframe failure in flight		Prop reversal
LANDING		Abandoned aircraft		Uncontrollable porpoising in flight
Approach		Prop or jet-blast		Struck arresting barrier
Flare-out		Equipment loss in flight		Touch and go
Roll		Other (indicate)		Other (indicate)
GO-AROUND	X	Undetermined		X Unknown
OTHER (indicate)				

Section L—CAUSE FACTOR ANALYSIS

(See AFM 62-5 for definitions)

P	C	Check one primary cause factor (P), and those contributory cause factors (C) that may be applicable. NOTE: Contributory cause factors may appear in same major category as primary cause, i. e.—both primary and contributing cause factors may be "Operator error."
	OPERATOR ERROR	Incorrect operation of the aircraft or its systems; improper technique; inadequate flight preparation; improper procedures; faulty judgment, etc., by person(s) at controls of aircraft at time of accident.
	CREWMEMBER ERROR	Error committed by any member of the flight crew except operator(s).
X	SUPERVISORY ERROR	Inadequate exercise of command; inadequate supervision of aircrews, operations, maintenance and other functions supporting flying operations; inadequate supervision of training, etc. (Incl. IP's & AC's)
X	MAINTENANCE ERROR	Improper repair, service, inspection or installation of aircraft components, parts or systems; inadequate or improper compliance with established maintenance procedures.
X	OTHER PERSONNEL ERRORS	Errors committed by other than aircrew, supervisory or maintenance personnel. Includes GCA, Weather, Tower, Communications, Installations and any other supporting personnel, etc.
X	MATERIEL FAILURE	Failure or malfunction of the airframe, engine or any other system, component or accessory of the aircraft, etc.
	AIR BASE OR AIRWAYS	Any malfunction, inadequacy or absence of air base and/or airways equipment or facilities, including deficiencies and hazards of runways, taxiways, aprons, overruns, clear zones, etc.
	WEATHER CONDITIONS	Reduced visibility, icing, turbulence, thunderstorms, surface wind, winds aloft, low ceiling, etc.
	MISCELLANEOUS CONDITIONS	Bird strikes, struck tow target, chock, ricochets, hypoxia, vertigo, fatigue, etc.
	UNDETERMINED	

Present detailed description of acts, events, or conditions considered to be primary or contributory cause factors (separate paragraph for each) in FINDINGS portion of Narrative Description of Accident required by Section M.

Section M—INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT

THE "NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION" WILL INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION PREPARED ON SEPARATE SHEETS OF PAPER AND ATTACHED TO THE AF FORM 14.

1. HISTORY OF FLIGHT (See AFM 62-5)

A concise narrative of all established facts and circumstances in chronological order of the flight from takeoff to termination will be presented. i.e., date, time and point of departure; type of clearance, mission, destination, hours of fuel, ETC; position reports; weather, etc.

2. INVESTIGATION AND ANALYSIS (See AFM 62-5)

This section will vary in content according to the complexity of the accident and the extent of the investigation. Depending upon the nature of the accident, separate paragraphs should describe the examination, analysis and findings of any or all of the following: aircraft engines; airframe and structures; control system; electrical system; hydraulic system; flight instruments; navigational aids and air base facilities; adequacy of command and staff supervision of flying operations and training; adequacy of maintenance procedures; inspection and training; unit directives and SOPs; and any other factors pertinent to the accident. List and discuss any violations.

3. FINDINGS (See AFM 62-5 for details of presentation)

This section will list the significant factual determinations resulting from investigation of the accident. Separate paragraphs will be used to examine the following: primary cause of the accident; each contributing cause factor of the accident; various deficiencies or inadequacies of equipment, procedure, operations, maintenance, supervision, facilities, etc., which although not direct contributing factors to this accident, are hazards to safety of flight; various considerations not related to contributory causes of the accident but implementation or installation of which would have decreased or minimized the probability of the accident having occurred.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS (See AFM 62-5 for details of presentation)

This section will contain, in concise and direct statements, a listing of the remedial or corrective actions which, in the opinion of the investigating officer or board, will prevent recurrence of similar type accidents and eliminate the deficiencies cited in "Findings" of the investigation.

RECORDER'S CHECKLIST FOR ATTACHMENTS TO THE AF FORM 14

(See AFM 62-5 for desired sequence of AF Form 14 series and attachments)

THE FOLLOWING WILL BE ATTACHED TO ALL REPORTS OF MAJOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS (AF FORM 14)		THE FOLLOWING WILL BE ATTACHED TO REPORTS OF MAJOR ACCIDENTS WHEN APPLICABLE	
1. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Narrative description of Accident (Section M)	14.	Board proceedings
2. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	AF Form 14A	15.	Statement of control tower operator(s)
3. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	AF Form 14B	16.	Statement of runway control officer
4.	AF Form 9, Pilot(s) involved (See Sec. D, Item 15)	17. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Statement of weather forecaster
5.	Statements of crew members and witnesses (when available)	18.	Statement of rebuttal or statements declining the opportunity
6.	List of Technical Orders not complied with (See Section G, Item 8)	19. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Transcripts of communications recordings
7. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	DD Form 175 or AF Form 113 (Clearance)	20.	Statement of damage to private property
8.	DD Form 781-1	21. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Map showing geographical location of accident
9.	DD Form 781-2	22. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	DD 365F (Form F)
10.	Diagram of scene of accident	23. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	AF Form 14C
11. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Photographs (identified)	24.	AF Form 14D
12. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Index to AF Form 14 attachments	25.	AF Form 14E
13.	NOTE: Determine Security classification of reports (if applicable)	26.	AF Form 14F
		27.	AF TO 29 (Unsatisfactory Report)
		28.	If aircraft being transferred, ferried, etc., attach copies of coordination messages showing gaining and losing organizations

Section N—AUTHENTICATION

(NAME AND GRADE)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Majors, USAF

President

THOMAS W. GRIFFIN, Col., USAF

(b) (6)

USAF

AIR Representatives

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Majors, USAF

Comdr., USAF

Section C - PILOT(S) INVOLVED (Flight Crew)

2. OTHER PILOT

a. LAST NAME	FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME	GRADE	COMPONENT	SERVICE NUMBER	NATIONALITY	BIRTH
CIRBUS	DOMINIC EDWARD	LTJG	USN	(b) (6)	US	(b) (6)
b. POSITION IN AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF ACCIDENT		c. ASSIGNED DUTY ON FLIGHT ORDER				
UNKNOWN		CP				
d. ASSIGNED ORGANIZATION						
Major Command	Subcommand or AF	Air Division	Wing	Group	Squadron or Unit	Base
MATS	- - - - -	ATLD	1611th ATW	--	VR-6	McGuire AFB, NJ
e. ATTACHED ORGANIZATION FOR FLYING						
Major Command	Subcommand or AF	Air Division	Wing	Group	Squadron or Unit	Base
MATS	- - - - -	ATLD	1611th ATW	--	VR-6	McGuire AFB, NJ
f. ORIG. AERO RATING & DATE RECEIVED	g. PRESENT AERO RATING AND DATE RECEIVED	h. INSTRUMENT CARD			i. AFSC	
Naval Aviator 1 April 1953	Naval Aviator 1 April 1953	Type Standard	Date of	expiration 1 May 1957	Primary	NA
					Duty	NA

10

SECTION II-PERSONNEL INVOLVED

AF Form 1a

Duty at time of accident [REDACTED]	Name (Last name first, Grade, Rank, Branch of Service)	Type of Component	Organ. [REDACTED] (3)	Injury Class or Missing [REDACTED] (5)
AC (PPR)	LOWE, FRED B., 1SG, USN	(b) (6) 1315, NAV AV	MATS, 1611TR ATW, VR6 McGuire AFB, NJ	MISSING
AC	WILLIS, WILLIAM A., 1SG, USN	(b) (6) NAV	" "	" "
1st Pit	GIBBS, DOMINIC R., 1SG, USN	(b) (6) NAV	" "	" "
Pit Engt	SMITH, FRANK A., A/2C, USN	(b) (6) USN	" "	" "
Pit Engr (tr)	TIGHE, HINMAN M., A/2C, USN	(b) (6) USN	" "	" "
Pit Orderly	MCGRATH, ROBERT W., USN	(b) (6) USAF	" "	" "
Pit Radio	RINGER, JAMES J., A/2C, USN	(b) (6) USAF	" "	" "
Pit Radio	MILLEY, ROBERT J., A/2C, USN	(b) (6) USAF	" "	" "
Passenger	JOKELA, ROGER A., A/2C, USN	(b) (6) USAF	USAF Lincoln AFB, Neb	" "
	RYAN, ROBERT W., CAPT., USN	(b) (6) USAF	" "	" "
	GOODRICH, KENNETH E., CAPT., USN	(b) (6) USAF	" "	" "
	BEARD, ALBERT L., A/2C, USN	(b) (6) USAF	" "	" "
	BROOKHORN, DALE R., A/2C, USN	(b) (6) USAF	" "	" "
	BUEHLER, CONRAD J., A/2C, USN	(b) (6) USAF	" "	" "
	DISCOTA, THOMAS J., A/2C, USN	(b) (6) USAF	" "	" "
	DREHL, ROSSOB F., A/2C, USN	(b) (6) USAF	" "	" "
	DEWOLF, EDMUND R., A/2C, USN	(b) (6) USAF	" "	" "
	DISANTO, JOHN P., A/2C, USN	(b) (6) USAF	" "	" "
	FERGUSON, WILLIS B., A/2C, USN	(b) (6) USAF	" "	" "
	HAINES, ALTON J., A/2C, USN	(b) (6) USAF	" "	" "
	GARDNER, ROLAND L., A/2C, USN	(b) (6) USAF	" "	" "
	GIANGIOLA, GREER D., A/B, USN	(b) (6) USAF	" "	" "
	GRADY, BILLY B., A/2C, USN	(b) (6) USAF	" "	" "
	BRUNNBERG, EUGENE L., A/2C, USN	(b) (6) USAF	" "	" "
	HARDING, LLOYD D., A/2C, USN	(b) (6) USAF	" "	" "
	NEPLER, CLOYSE A., A/2C, USN	(b) (6) USAF	" "	" "
	HUMMEL, GERARD A., A/2C, USN	(b) (6) USAF	" "	" "
	HUTCH, RICHARD A., A/2C, USN	(b) (6) USAF	" "	" "
	KARR, LES R., A/2C, USN	(b) (6) USAF	" "	" "
	KING, RONALD L., A/2C, USN	(b) (6) USAF	" "	" "
	LADA, ROBERT A/2C, USN	(b) (6) USAF	" "	" "
	LIPIKA, ROBERT H., A/2C, USN	(b) (6) USAF	" "	" "
	LOCK, MARGARET W., A/2C, USN	(b) (6) USAF	" "	" "
	LOOMIS, JOSEPH A/2C, USN	(b) (6) USAF	" "	" "
	LUCE, GEORGE T., A/2C, USN	(b) (6) USAF	" "	" "
	MACHONIA, MICHAEL C., A/2C, USN	(b) (6) USAF	" "	" "
	MOONTAIN, RONALD P., A/2C, USN	(b) (6) USAF	" "	" "
	OOGAR, STANLEY A/2C, USN	(b) (6) USAF	" "	" "
	PAGETT, RALPH N., A/2C, USN	(b) (6) USAF	" "	" "
	PETERSON, KEITH A., A/2C, USN	(b) (6) USAF	" "	" "
	RAE, WILLIAM R., A/2C, USN	(b) (6) USAF	" "	" "
	REYNOLDS, DONALD A., A/2C, USN	(b) (6) USAF	" "	" "
	SOMMER, DONALD J., A/2C, USN	(b) (6) USAF	" "	" "
	SCHOTT, JAMES L., A/2C, USN	(b) (6) USAF	" "	" "
	SCHUVEER, HENRY J., A/2C, USN	(b) (6) USAF	" "	" "
	SILLIER, ABELAR JR., A/2C, USN	(b) (6) USAF	" "	" "
	SPURLINT, ROBERT D., A/2C, USN	(b) (6) USAF	" "	" "
	STEWART, BRUCE B., A/2C, USN	(b) (6) USAF	" "	" "
	TANNER, EARL B., A/2C, USN	(b) (6) USAF	" "	" "
	URBAN, ROBERT C., A/2C, USN	(b) (6) USAF	" "	" "
	VADY, SARAH Y., A/2C, USN	(b) (6) USAF	" "	" "
	WHITLOCK, JAMES D., A/2C, USN	(b) (6) USAF	" "	" "
	WILLIAMSON, ERIC J., A/2C, USN	(b) (6) USAF	" "	" "
	WATKINS, WILLIAM H., A/2C, USN	(b) (6) USAF	" "	" "

SECTION E-PERSONNEL INVOLVED (CONTINUED)

"	DRAKE, RAYMOND, A/2C,	(b) (6)	USAF	"
"	BANKS, HERBERT, A/2C,	(b) (6)	USAF	"
"	GIBERSON, LYLE C., A/2C,	(b) (6)	USAF	"
"	GODFERT, GENE O., A/2C,	(b) (6)	USAF	"
"	BARNAH, CHARLES W., A/2C,	(b) (6)	USAF	"


ITEM 7 and 9: Unknown

12

1. HISTORY OF FLIGHT: Navy R6D type aircraft, serial number 131588 departed Lakenheath RAF Station, England on a SAC Support mission at 1826Z, 10 October 1956. The flight plan, as filed, was to Lajes AFB, Azores with an estimated time enroute of 5 hours and 55 minutes at an altitude of 16,000 feet. All normal in-flight position reports were accomplished. The last position report received placed the aircraft at 48°N 10°W at 2036Z with an estimate for 45°N 15°W of 2137Z. No other messages were received from this aircraft. Subsequent search of the area around the last reported position resulted in a main landing gear and life raft being picked up by a surface vessel at 47°20'N 12°44'W. This position is presumed to be the area in which the aircraft went down.

2. INVESTIGATIONS AND ANALYSIS:

(b) (5)



(b) (5)

3. FINDINGS: The primary and contributing causes of this accident are undetermined due to the lack of recovered wreckage or survivors.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS: (b) (5)

(b) (5)

MEDICAL REPORT OF AF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT

Use this form in accordance with AF Reg. 62-14 and AF Manual 62-5, "Aircraft Accident Prevention Manual." Fill in all spaces applicable. If additional space is needed, use additional sheet(s) and identify by proper section letter and subsection number.

Section A—GENERAL INFORMATION

1. BASE INVESTIGATING ACCIDENT McGUIRE AIR FORCE BASE	2. ASSIGNED BASE OF AIRCRAFT McGUIRE AIR FORCE BASE	3. APPROXIMATE DISTANCE OF ACCIDENT FROM INVESTIGATING BASE (Miles) Unknown
4. PLACE OF ACCIDENT Unknown	5. AIRCRAFT TYPE, MODEL, SERIES SERIAL NUMBER B6D 131588	6. TIME OF ACCIDENT (local) Unknown
		7. DATE OF ACCIDENT 10 Oct 56

8. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF FACTORS AND EVENTS LEADING TO ACCIDENT

B6D #31588 arrived Lakenheath 0800Z 9 Oct 56; departed at 1826Z. Crew rest period extended from 0200Z to 1130Z. No physio-medical affection incident to crew proficiency, fatigue, disease or disorder was registered or evidenced.

Section B—EQUIPMENT AND AIRCRAFT STRUCTURES

(USE ADDITIONAL SHEETS AS NECESSARY)

1. FIXED SEATS: Nr. 58 Nr. occupied 58 Nr. failed	6. PROTECTIVE HELMET: Available to all pers.? Yes No X Type (e. g. P-1, P-1A, P-3, etc.) Used by all pers.? Yes No Nr. used Failed? Yes No Nr. failed
2. EJECTION SEATS: Nr. Avail. (armed) Used? Yes No Nr. used in downward ejection ✓/A Nr. used in upward ejection Failed? Yes No Nr. failed	7. ANTI G SUIT: Available to all pers.? Yes No X Type (e. g. G-3, G-4, etc.) Used by all pers.? Yes No Nr. used Failed? Yes No Nr. failed
3. CABIN PRESSURIZATION: Available to all pers.? Yes X No Used by all pers.? Yes X No Failed? Yes No	8. PARACHUTES: Available to all pers.? Yes No X Type (e. g. back pack, seat pack, etc.) Used by all pers.? Yes No Nr. used Failed? Yes No Nr. failed
4. OXYGEN SYSTEM: Available to all pers.? Yes X No Type (e. g. high pressure, low pressure, etc.) Low pressure Used by all pers.? Yes X No Date serviced Failed? Yes No Time used this flight Amount used this flight UNKNOWN	9. AUTOMATIC LAP BELT RELEASE: Available for all pers. Yes No X Used by all pers.? Yes No Nr. failed Failed? Yes No Nr. failed
5. OXYGEN MASK: Available to all pers.? Yes X No Type (e. g. A-12A, Pressure demand, etc.) Pressure Demand Used by all personnel? Yes No Did mask(s) fit? Yes X No Nr. poorly fitted Failed? Yes No Nr. failed Nr. used	10. OTHER PERSONAL EQUIPMENT (SPECIFY) Type (e. g. pressure suit) Nr. Used Nr. Failed 20

11. SPECIAL FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO OR PREVENTED INJURY: (List any items of personal or aircraft equipment, details of structure, incidents such as being trapped in plane, or any other factors which aided or impeded escape from aircraft.)

✓/A

12. SPECIFICALLY DESCRIBE DAMAGE TO	Cockpit Unknown
	Seats, shoulder harness, safety belt Unknown
	Crew stations (other than cockpit) Unknown
	Emergency exits, hatches, canopies Unknown
	Passenger cabin Unknown

Section C—PERSONNEL INVOLVED—(Note: List all personnel aboard the aircraft at the time of the accident including passengers)

NAME AND RANK	RATING SYMBOL	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	Flight Duty	AT TIME OF ACCIDENT Body Function	Location in Aircraft	SHOULDER HARNESS			SAFETY BELT			ESCAPE EXIT USED (Designate)	RESULT
							Available	Used	Failed	Available	Used	Failed		
LONE, FRED S. 1st. Cadet	AC	66	163	P			X		X					5
WILLIS, WILLIAM A. 1st. Cadet	AC	71½	166	DoP			X		X					5
CIRIBUS, DOMINIC E. 1st. Cadet	FE	72	165	H			X		X					5
SMITH, FRANK A. AD2	FE	68	167	PL			X		X					5
STONE, NEWMAN H. AD2	FE	70	155	PL			X		X					5
KIRK, ROBERT J. AD2	RD	70	170	RD			X		X					5
ZOKELA, Roger A. AD2	RD	67½	147	RD			X		X					5
RIMELIN, James J. AR	FES	69½	140	PLS			X		X					5
McCLERNING, Robert W. AR	FES	72	166	PLS			X		X					5

PASSENGERS:
 (b) (6)
 RYAN ROBERT W. GATE
 (b) (6)
 GOODMAN KENNETH E.
 (b) (6)
 BEARD ALBERT L.
 (b) (6)

See Attachment.

Use following code numbers and letters for position of body: Seated (1); Standing (2); Prostrate (3); Supine (4); Crouched (5); Facing forward (F); Facing rear (R); Facing inward (I); Facing outward (O).
 Examples: 2F means Standing Facing Forward; 5B means Crouched Facing Rear, etc.

Use following code numbers to specify result to personnel: (1) No injury; (2) Minor injury; (3) Major injury; (4) Fatal; (5) Missing. (See AFR 62-14.)

Section D—MEDICAL OFFICER'S RECOMMENDATIONS

None

(b) (6)
 (b) (6)

(SIGNATURE)

(NAME AND GRADE)

PASSENGERS Continued:

BURKLER CORRA J. A/2C AF (b) (6)
DECOTTA THOMAS I. TS AF (b) (6)
DEEL ROSCOE F. A/3C AF (b) (6)
DEWOLF EDMUND R A/2C AF (b) (6)
DISANTO JOHN P A/2C AF (b) (6)
FERGUSON WILLIE B. A/3C AF (b) (6)
GAINES ALTON J A/1C AF (b) (6)
GARDNER ROLAND I. A/3C AF (b) (6)
GIANCOLA GREGOR D. AB AF (b) (6)
GROGAN BILLY B. A/2C AF (b) (6)
GRUENBERG EUGENE D. A/1C AF (b) (6)
HARDING LLOYD D. A/1C AF (b) (6)
HEPLER CLOTHIE A. A/2C AF (b) (6)
HUMMEL GERARD A A/3C AF (b) (6)
HUNTER RICHARD K A/1C AF (b) (6)
KANE LEE R A/3C AF (b) (6)
KING RONALD L A/1C AF (b) (6)
LADA ROBERT A/2C AF (b) (6)
LIPINA ROBERT H A/3C AF (b) (6)
LOCK SHERMAN W A/3C AF (b) (6)
LOONTIENE JOSEPH D A/1C AF (b) (6)
LUCE GEORGE F A/2C AF (b) (6)
MACEDOVIA MICHAEL C A/1C AF (b) (6)
MOUNTAIN RONALD F A/2C AF (b) (6)
OSGAAR CHARLES A/2C AF (b) (6)
FAGELLI RALPH W JR A/2C AF (b) (6)
PETERSON KEITH A A/1C AF (b) (6)
RAE WILLIAM R A/2C AF (b) (6)
REYNOLDS DONALD L A/3C AF (b) (6)
ROMAN LEONARD J. A/2C AF (b) (6)
SCHORR JAMES L A/2C AF (b) (6)
SCHUVER HENRY J A/2C AF (b) (6)
SILLIER ABELAR JR A/3C AF (b) (6)
SPURLINO ROBERT D A/3C AF (b) (6)
STEWART BRUCE B. A/3C AF (b) (6)
TANNER, EARL E. A/3C AF (b) (6)
URBAN ROBERT C A/1C AF (b) (6)
VASEY EARL F A/1C AF (b) (6)
WHITLOCK JAMES B. AF A/2C
WILLIAMSON FR G JR A/2C AF (b) (6)
CAIRSE WILLIAM MS AF (b) (6)
DRAKE RAYMOND A/2C AF (b) (6)
BANKS HERBERT A/2C AF (b) (6)
GIBERSON LILLIE C A/2C AF (b) (6)
GOUPERT GENE O A/2C AF (b) (6)
HANNAH CHARLES W A/2C AF (b) (6)

**MEDICAL REPORT OF AN INDIVIDUAL INVOLVED IN
AF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT**

Use this form in accordance with AF Reg. 62-14 and AF Manual 62-5, "Aircraft Accident Prevention-Investigation-Reporting." If additional space is needed, use Section F hereof and/or additional sheet(s) as necessary, identifying by proper section letter.

Section A—GENERAL INFORMATION

1. LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME	2. SERVICE NR.	3. DATE OF ACCIDENT	4. CURRENT RATING AND DATE	5. FLIGHT DUTY AT TIME OF ACCIDENT
LOWE FRED BURTON	(b) (6)	10 Oct 56	Naval Aviator	Pilot
6. DATE OF BIRTH	7. PILOT'S AFSC	8. WAS PILOT ON FLYING STATUS: WITH WAIVER?	DATE GRANTED	FOR WHAT DEFECT?
Age 35	Primary Duty	Yes No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	-	-
9. DATE OF LAST PHYSICAL EXAM FOR FLYING		10. NUMBER OF DAYS RESTRICTED FROM FLYING AS RESULT OF THIS ACCIDENT		
Class I 3 May 56		Actual Explain:	Estimated N/A	
Defects (Specify)				
11. DAYS HOSPITALIZED: Est. Actual		12. IF FATAL, TIME AND DATE OF DEATH		
Est. Actual		Time Unknown		
13. WAS AUTOPSY PERFORMED?		14. SPECIFY PRIMARY INJURY OR PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH		
Yes No Report fully in Section F		15. MEANS USED TO IDENTIFY BODY		
Unknown		N/A		

Section B—PERSONAL FACTORS (Pilot or Crew Member Only)

One or more checks should be given for items 1 through 8 below. A narrative statement giving the information on which each check is based is desirable.

1. HOW DID THE MAN REACT DURING THE ACCIDENT SEQUENCE?

(Check one)

Happened too quickly for corrective action.

Inadequate corrective action taken due to faulty judgment.

No corrective action taken due to failure to recognize the situation.

Remained calm but took adequate corrective action too late.

Faulty corrective action taken due to emotional confusion.

X Could not obtain information (fatality, etc.).

Other (Explain)

For additional narrative:

23

2. Did the man demonstrate a tendency toward any of the following?

Before Accident	Immediately Following (12 hrs.)	Over 24 Hrs. Later	Before Accident	Immediately Following (12 hrs.)	Over 24 Hrs. Later	
						Excessive elation
						Feeling of persecution
						Amnesia
						Disorientation for time, place or person
						Use of alcohol or drugs (explain)
				X	X	Unable to determine (fatality, etc.)
						No abnormal reaction
						Other (Specify)

For additional narrative:

Section B—PERSONAL FACTORS (Continued)

Check Factors in Human Error Which Could Have Caused or Contributed to the Accident. Check as many as necessary.

1. EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING

- Limited experience this type aircraft
- Lack of recent experience this type aircraft
- Inadequate training for accident cause factor
- Other (explain) _____

Experience and training not a factor

Could not be determined (fatality, etc.)

4. SUPERVISION (applies to both air and ground activities)

Ordered on flight plan beyond ability

Led into flight conditions beyond ability

Inadequate briefing

Poor crew coordination

Malsigned

Other (explain) _____

No supervision factors involved

Could not be determined (fatality, etc.)

5. PRE-FLIGHT FACTORS

- Faulty flight plan
- Failed to anticipate possible hazards
- Inadequate aircraft preflight check
- Not in proper physical or mental condition
- Other (explain) _____

No faulty preflight factors involved

Could not be determined (fatality, etc.)

6. IN-FLIGHT FACTORS

- Faulty decision
 - Use of controls
 - Flight procedure
 - Route or weather
 - Other (explain) _____
- Faulty interpretation
- Tower or other instructions
 - Instrument, lights and cockpit items
 - Outside conditions (closing speed, etc.)
 - Other (explain) _____
- Faulty technique

Faulty attention

- Low level (inattention)
- Inadequate vision (channelized attention)
- Distracted
- Faulty anticipation

Other (explain) _____

Faulty attitude

- Overconfidence
- Excessive apprehension
- Excessive motivation (desire to get home, etc.)
- Poor motivation (poor morale, etc.)
- Other (explain) _____

Poor physical condition (fatigue, etc.)

Deficiencies in cockpit or instruments

Other (explain) _____

No in-flight factors involved

Could not be determined (fatality, etc.)

7. RELATED FACTORS

- Concern over military status
- Lack of confidence in leadership
- Lack of confidence in aircraft
- Recent near accidents, accidents, etc.
- Family difficulties
- Financial worries
- Living conditions
- Philosophical or religious conflicts
- Other (explain) _____
- Not a factor

Could not be determined (fatality, etc.)

8. MARITAL STATUS

- Single
- Divorced
- Married
- Engaged

9. PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING

Date last course completed

26 Mar 56

Date of last mask fitting

Fitted by whom

10. POST ACCIDENT TESTS

Accomplished How Long After Accident
(in hours)

RESULTS: (Specify names of tests used)

Blood

CO (Percent saturation)

Alcohol

Other (Specify) _____

Visual Tests

Other tests

Other (Specify) _____

N/A

11. ADDITIONAL PERSONAL FACTORS:


Section C—FRACTURES, BURNS, AND AMPUTATIONS

Use Skeletal Chart below to mark exact site of fractures. Specify type as Simple, Simple Comminuted, Compound, Compound Comminuted.
Use figures below to mark burns, soft tissue injuries, and amputations. Identify degree of burn as 1st degree, 2d degree, 3d degree.
List all injuries according to existing regulations.

B/A



RIGHT



LEFT



Section D—DIAGNOSIS

Describe in detail, according to existing regulations, all injuries or abnormal conditions. Include length and depth of lacerations, exact description of injury site, etc. Include comment on psychic or emotional effects, shock, etc., apparent at time of this report.

Section E—STRUCTURES AND EQUIPMENT

Describe fully all aircraft structures or equipment which contributed to the injuries identified in Sections C and D heretofore. Include any recommendations for changes leading to prevention of similar injuries.

Unknown

Section F—TREATMENT AND COMPLICATIONS

Describe treatment given, i. e., repair of lacerations; open reduction of fractures; etc. Describe any complications and list any significant sequelae.

B/A

Section G—USE THIS SPACE FOR REPORT OF AUTOPSY OR FOR ANY EXTENSIONS OF PRECEDING SECTIONS

9c

(USE ADDITIONAL SHEETS AS NECESSARY)

DATE 29Oct56	GRADE Captain	FLIGHT SURGEON OR AME (b) (6)	AME (b) (6)
------------------------	-------------------------	---	-----------------------

**MEDICAL REPORT OF AN INDIVIDUAL INVOLVED IN
AN AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT**

Use this form in accordance with AF Reg. 62-14 and AF Manual 62-5, "Aircraft Accident Prevention-Investigation Reporting". If additional space is needed, use Section F hereof and/or additional sheet(s) as necessary, identifying by proper section letter.

Section A—GENERAL INFORMATION

1. LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME		2. SERVICE NR.	3. DATE OF ACCIDENT	4. CURRENT RATING	5. FLIGHT DUTY AT TIME OF ACCIDENT
VILLIS, WILLIAM ALEXANDER		(b) (6)	10 Oct '56	Navy Aviator	Co-Pilot
6. DATE OF BIRTH		7. PILOT'S AFSC	8. WAS PILOT ON FLYING STATUS WITH WAIVER?	DATE GRANTED	FOR WHAT DEFECT?
(b) (6)		Primary Duty	Yes No X	-	-
9. DATE OF LAST PHYSICAL EXAM. FOR FLYING					
Class I 16 April '56			Actual	Estimated	
Class II Defects (Specify):			Explain:	N/A	
11. DAYS HOSPITALIZED: Est. Actual (If none indicate) N/A			12. IF FATAL, TIME AND DATE OF DEATH		
DAYS IN QUARTERS: Est. Actual			10 Oct 56 Time Unknown		
14. SPECIFY PRIMARY INJURY OR PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH Unknown					
15. MEANS USED TO IDENTIFY BODY N/A					

Section B—PERSONAL FACTORS (Pilot or Crew Member Only)

One or more checks should be given for items 1 through 8 below. A narrative statement giving the information on which each check is based is desirable.

1. HOW DID THE MAN REACT DURING THE ACCIDENT SEQUENCE?

[Check one]

Happened too quickly for corrective action.

No corrective action taken due to failure to recognize the situation.

Faulty corrective action taken due to emotional confusion

Inadequate corrective action taken due to faulty judgment.

Remained calm but took adequate corrective action too late.

Could not obtain information (fatality, etc.).

Other (Explain)

For additional narrative

27

3. Did the man demonstrate a tendency toward any of the following?

Before Accident	Immediately Following (12 hrs.)	Over 24 Hrs. Later		Before Accident	Immediately Following (12 hrs.)	Over 24 Hrs. Later	
		Excessive anxiety					Excessive elation
		Guilt feeling					Feeling of persecution
		Obsessive compulsive behavior					Amnesia
		Phobic reactions					Disorientation for time, place or person
		Psychosomatic complaints					Use of alcohol or drugs (explain)
		Abnormal fatigue (neurotic)					Unable to determine (fatality, etc.)
		Withdrawal behavior					No abnormal reaction
		Depression					Other (Specify)

For additional narrative

Section B—PERSONAL FACTORS (Continued)

Check Factors in Human Error Which Could Have Caused or Contributed to the Accident. Check as many as necessary

3. EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING

- Limited experience this type aircraft
- Lack of recent experience this type aircraft
- Inadequate training for accident cause factor
- Other (explain) _____

Experience and training not a factor

Could not be determined (fatality, etc.)

4. SUPERVISION (applies to both air and ground activities)

Ordered on flight plan beyond ability

Led into flight conditions beyond ability

Inadequate briefing

Poor crew coordination

Malassigned

Other (explain) _____

No supervision factors involved

Could not be determined (fatality, etc.)

5. PRE-FLIGHT FACTORS

Faulty flight plan

Failed to anticipate possible hazards

Inadequate aircraft preflight check

Not in proper physical or mental condition

Other (explain) _____

No faulty preflight factors involved

Could not be determined (fatality, etc.)

6. IN-FLIGHT FACTORS

Faulty decision

Use of controls

Flight procedure

Route or weather

Other (explain) _____

Faulty interpretation

Tower or other instructions

Instrument, lights and cockpit items

Outside conditions (closing speed, etc.)

Other (explain) _____

Faulty technique

Faulty attention

Low level (inattention)

Inadequate vision (channelized attention)

Distracted

Faulty anticipation

Other (explain) _____

Faulty attitude

Overconfidence

Excessive apprehension

Excessive motivation (desire to get home, etc.)

Poor motivation (poor morale, etc.)

Other (explain) _____

Poor physical condition (fatigue, etc.)

Deficiencies in cockpit or instruments

Other (explain) _____

No in-flight factors involved

Could not be determined (fatality, etc.)

7. RELATED FACTORS

Concern over military status

Lack of confidence in leadership

Lack of confidence in aircraft

Recent near accidents, accidents, etc.

Family difficulties

Financial worries

Living conditions

Philosophical or religious conflicts

Other (explain) _____

Not a factor

Could not be determined (fatality, etc.)

8. MARITAL STATUS

Single

Divorced

Married

Engaged

9. PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING

Date last course completed **20 Apr 54**

Date of last mask fitting

Fitted by whom

10. POST ACCIDENT TESTS

Accomplished: How Long After Accident
(in hours)

RESULTS: (Specify names of tests used)

Blood

CO (Percent saturation)

Alcohol

Other (Specify)

N/A

Visual Tests

Other tests

Other (Specify)

11. ADDITIONAL PERSONAL FACTORS:

Section C—FRACTURES, BURNS, AND AMPUTATIONS

Use Skeletal Chart below to mark exact site of fractures. Specify type as Simple, Simple Comminuted, Compound, Compound Comminuted.




Use figures below to mark burns, soft tissue injuries, and amputations. Identify degree of burn as: 1st degree, 2d degree, 3d degree.

List all injuries according to existing regulations.

N/A

RIGHT

LEFT



29

Section D—DIAGNOSIS

Describe in detail, according to existing regulations, all injuries or abnormal conditions. Include length and depth of lacerations, exact description of injury site, etc. Include comment on psychic or emotional effects, shock, etc., apparent at time of this report.

Section E—STRUCTURES AND EQUIPMENT

Describe fully all aircraft structures or equipment which contributed to the injuries identified in Sections C and D hereof. Include any recommendations for changes leading to prevention of similar injuries.

Unknown

Section F—TREATMENT AND COMPLICATIONS

Describe treatment given, i. e., repair of lacerations, open reduction of fractures, etc. Describe any complications and list any significant sequelae.

N/A

Section G—USE THIS SPACE FOR REPORT OF AUTOPSY OR FOR ANY EXTENSIONS OF PRECEDING SECTIONS

[USE ADDITIONAL SHEETS AS NECESSARY]

DATE 29Oct56	GRADE Captain	(b) (6)
-----------------	------------------	---------

(b) (6)

**MEDICAL REPORT OF AN INDIVIDUAL INVOLVED IN
AF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT**

Use this form in accordance with AF Reg. 62-14 and AF Manual 62-5, "Aircraft Accident Prevention-Investigation-Reporting". If additional space is needed, use Section F hereof and/or additional sheet(s) as necessary, identifying by proper section letter.

Section A—GENERAL INFORMATION

1. LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME	2. SERVICE NR.	3. DATE OF ACCIDENT	4. CURRENT RATING	5. FLIGHT DUTY AT TIME OF ACCIDENT
CIRRUS DOMINIC EDWARD	(b) (6)	10 Oct 56	Naval Aviator	NAV.
6. DATE OF BIRTH	7. PILOT'S AFSC	8. WAS PILOT ON FLYING STATUS WITH WAIVER?	DATE GRANTED	FOR WHAT DEFECT?
(b) (6)	Primary Duty	Yes No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	—	—
9. DATE OF LAST PHYSICAL EXAM. FOR FLYING		10. NUMBER OF DAYS RESTRICTED FROM FLYING AS RESULT OF THIS ACCIDENT		
Class I Class II 20 Oct 55		Actual Explain:	Estimated N/A	
Defects (Specify)				
11. DAYS HOSPITALIZED [If none indicate]	Est. Actual	12. IF FATAL, TIME AND DATE OF DEATH	13. WAS AUTOPSY PERFORMED?	
DAYS IN QUARTERS: Est. Actual	N/A	10 Oct 56 Time Unknown	Yes <input type="checkbox"/>	No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Report fully in Section F
14. SPECIFY PRIMARY INJURY OR PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH		15. MEANS USED TO IDENTIFY BODY		
Unknown		N/A		

Section B—PERSONAL FACTORS (Pilot or Crew Member Only)

One or more checks should be given for items 1 through 8 below. A narrative statement giving the information on which each check is based is desirable.

1. HOW DID THE MAN REACT DURING THE ACCIDENT SEQUENCE?

(Check one)

- Happened too quickly for corrective action.
- No corrective action taken due to failure to recognize the situation.
- Faulty corrective action taken due to emotional confusion.

Inadequate corrective action taken due to faulty judgment.

Remained calm but took adequate corrective action too late.

Could not obtain information (fatality, etc.).

Other (Explain)

For additional narrative

31

2. Did the man demonstrate a tendency toward any of the following?

Before Accident	Immediately Following (12 hrs.)	Over 24 Hrs. Later	Before Accident	Immediately Following (12 hrs.)	Over 24 Hrs. Later
		Excessive anxiety			Excessive elation
		Guilt feeling			Feeling of persecution
		Obsessive compulsive behavior			Amnesia
		Phobic reactions			Disorientation for time, place or person
		Psychosomatic complaints			Use of alcohol or drugs [explain]
		Abnormal fatigue (neurotic)			Unable to determine (fatality, etc.)
		Withdrawal behavior	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	No abnormal reaction
		Depression			Other (Specify)

For additional narrative

Section B—PERSONAL FACTORS (Continued)

Check Factors in Human Error Which Could Have Caused or Contributed to the Accident. Check as many as necessary.

3. EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING

- Limited experience this type aircraft
- Lack of recent experience this type aircraft
- Inadequate training for accident cause factor
- Other (explain)

Experience and training not a factor

Could not be determined (fatality, etc.)

4. SUPERVISION (applies to both air and ground activities)

- Ordered on flight plan beyond ability
- Led into flight conditions beyond ability
- Inadequate briefing
- Poor crew coordination
- Malassigned
- Other (explain)

No supervision factors involved

Could not be determined (fatality, etc.)

5. PRE-FLIGHT FACTORS

- Faulty flight plan
- Failed to anticipate possible hazards
- Inadequate aircraft preflight check
- Not in proper physical or mental condition
- Other (explain)

No faulty preflight factors involved

Could not be determined (fatality, etc.)

6. IN-FLIGHT FACTORS

- Faulty decision
 - Use of controls
 - Flight procedure
 - Route or weather
 - Other (explain)
- Faulty interpretation
 - Tower or other instructions
 - Instrument, lights and cockpit items
 - Outside conditions (closing speed, etc.)
 - Other (explain)
- Faulty technique

Faulty attention

Low level (inattention)

Inadequate vision (channelized attention)

Distracted

Faulty anticipation

Other (explain)

Faulty attitude

Overconfidence

Excessive apprehension

Excessive motivation (desire to get home, etc.)

Poor motivation (poor morale, etc.)

Other (explain)

Poor physical condition (fatigue, etc.)

Deficiencies in cockpit or instruments

Other (explain)

No in-flight factors involved

Could not be determined (fatality, etc.)

7. RELATED FACTORS

- Concern over military status
- Lack of confidence in leadership
- Lack of confidence in aircraft
- Recent near accidents, accidents, etc.
- Family difficulties
- Financial worries
- Living conditions
- Philosophical or religious conflicts
- Other (explain)

Not a factor

Could not be determined (fatality, etc.)

8. MARITAL STATUS

Single

Divorced

Married

Engaged

9. PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING

Date last course completed

15 Nov 55

Date of last mask fitting

Fitted by whom

10. POST ACCIDENT TESTS

Accomplished How Long After Accident
(in hours)

RESULTS: (Specify names of tests used)

Blood

CO (Percent saturation)

Alcohol

Other (Specify)

Visual Tests

Other tests


Other (Specify)

N/A

11. ADDITIONAL PERSONAL FACTORS:

Section C—FRACTURES, BURNS, AND AMPUTATIONS

Use Skeletal Chart below to mark exact site of fractures. Specify type as Simple, Simple Comminuted, Compound, Compound Comminuted.
Use Figures below to mark burns, soft tissue injuries, and amputations. Identify degree of burn as: 1st degree, 2d degree, 3d degree.
List all injuries according to existing regulations.



Section D—DIAGNOSIS

Describe in detail, according to existing regulations, all injuries or abnormal conditions. Include length and depth of lacerations, exact description of injury site, etc. Include comment on psychic or emotional effects, shock, etc., apparent at time of this report.

Section E—STRUCTURES AND EQUIPMENT

Describe fully all aircraft structures or equipment which contributed to the injuries identified in Sections C and D hereof. Include any recommendations for changes leading to prevention of similar injuries.

Unknown

Section F—TREATMENT AND COMPLICATIONS

Describe treatment given, i. e., repair of lacerations, open reduction of fractures, etc. Describe any complications and list any significant sequelae.

N/A

Section G—USE THIS SPACE FOR REPORT OF AUTOPSY OR FOR ANY EXTENSIONS OF PRECEDING SECTIONS

34

(b) (6)

(USE ADDITIONAL SHEETS AS NECESSARY)		
DATE 29 Oct 56	GRADE Captain	FLIGHT SURGEON OR AME (b) (6) AME
AF FORM 14b 1 FEB 56 Previous editions of this form may be used.		

(b) (6)

**MEDICAL REPORT OF AN INDIVIDUAL INVOLVED IN
AF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT**

Use this form in accordance with AF Reg. 62-14 and AF Manual 62-5, "Aircraft Accident Prevention-Investigation-Reporting". If additional space is needed, use Section F hereof and/or additional sheet(s) as necessary, identifying by model section where applicable.

Section A—GENERAL INFORMATION

1. LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME	2. SERVICE NR	3. DATE OF ACCIDENT	4. CURRENT RATING	5. FLIGHT DUTY AT TIME OF ACCIDENT
SMITH FRANK ALLEN	(b) (6)	10 Oct 56	Flt Engineer	Flt Eng.
6. DATE OF BIRTH	7. PILOT'S AFSC	8. WAS PILOT ON FLYING STATUS WITH WAIVER?	9. FOR WHAT DEFECTS	
(b) (6)	Primary Duty	Yes No		
10. DATE OF LAST PHYSICAL EXAM. FOR FLYING		11. NUMBER OF DAYS RESTRICTED FROM FLYING AS RESULT OF THIS ACCIDENT		
Class I	III 23 Mar 56	Actual	N/A	
Defects (Specify)		Explains:		
12. DAYS HOSPITALIZED	Estimated	Actual	13. IF FATAL TIME AND DATE OF DEATH	
(If none indicate)			Time	Was autopsy performed?
14. DAYS IN QUARTERS	Estimated	Actual	10 Oct 56 Unknown	Yes No
(15. SPECIFY PRIMARY INJURY OR PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH)			Report fully in Section E.	
Unknown			N/A	

Section B—PERSONAL FACTORS (Pilot or Crew Member Only)

One or more check should be given for items 1 through 8 below. A narrative statement giving the information on which each check is based is desirable.

1. HOW DID THE MAN REACT DURING THE ACCIDENT SEQUENCE?

(Check one)

- Happened too quickly for corrective action
- No corrective action taken due to failure to recognize the situation
- Faulty corrective action taken due to emotional confusion

For additional narrative

Adequate corrective action taken due to faulty judgment

Remained calm but took adequate corrective action too late

Could not obtain information (fatality, etc.).

Other (Explain)

35

2. Did the man demonstrate a tendency toward any of the following?

Before Accident	Immediately Following (12 hrs.)	Over 24 Hrs. Later	Before Accident	Immediately Following (12 hrs.)	Over 24 Hrs. Later	
						Excessive elation
						Feeling of persecution
						Amnesia
						Disorientation for time, place or person
						Use of alcohol or drugs (explain)
						Unable to determine (fatality, etc.)
						No abnormal reaction
						Other (Specify)

For additional narrative

Section B—PERSONAL FACTORS (Continued)

Check Factors in Human Error Which Could Have Caused or Contributed to the Accident. Check as many as necessary.

3. EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING

- Limited experience this type aircraft
- Lack of recent experience this type aircraft
- Inadequate training for accident cause factor
- Other (explain) _____

- Experience and training not a factor
- Could not be determined (fatality, etc.)

4. SUPERVISION (applies to both air and ground activities)

- Delayed on flight plan beyond ability
- Led into flight conditions beyond ability
- Inadequate briefing
- Poor crew coordination
- Misaligned
- Other (explain) _____
- No supervision factors involved

- Could not be determined (fatality, etc.)

5. PRE-FLIGHT FACTORS

- Faulty flight plan
- Failed to anticipate possible hazards
- Inadequate aircraft preflight check
- Not in proper physical or mental condition
- Other (explain) _____

- No faulty preflight factors involved
- Could not be determined (fatality, etc.)

6. IN-FLIGHT FACTORS

Faulty decision

- Use of controls
- Flight procedure
- Route or weather
- Other (explain) _____

Faulty interpretation

- Tower or other instructions
- Instrument, lights and cockpit items
- Outside conditions (closing speed, etc.)
- Other (explain) _____

Faulty technique

10. POST ACCIDENT TESTS

Accomplished How Long After Accident
(in hours)

- Blood
- CO (Percent saturation)
- Alcohol
- Other (Specify) _____
- Visual Tests
- Other tests
- Other (Specify) _____

W/A

RESULTS: (Specify names of tests used)

11. ADDITIONAL PERSONAL FACTORS:

Faulty attention

- Low level (inattention)
- Inadequate vision (channelized attention)
- Distracted
- Faulty anticipation
- Other (explain) _____

Faulty attitude

- Overconfidence
- Excessive apprehension
- Excessive motivation (desire to get home, etc.)
- Poor motivation (poor morale, etc.)
- Other (explain) _____

- Poor physical condition (fatigue, etc.)

- Deficiencies in cockpit or instruments

- Other (explain) _____

- No in-flight factors involved

- Could not be determined (fatality, etc.)

7. RELATED FACTORS

- Concern over military status

- Lack of confidence in leadership

- Lack of confidence in aircraft

- Recent near accidents, accidents, etc.

- Family difficulties

- Financial worries

- Living conditions

- Philosophical or religious conflicts

- Other (explain) _____

- Not a factor

- Could not be determined (fatality, etc.)

8. MARITAL STATUS

- Single

- Married

9. PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING

- Date last course completed


- Date of last mask fitting

- Fitted by whom

August 56

Section C—FRACTURES, BURNS, AND AMPUTATIONS

Use Skeletal Chart below to mark exact site of fractures. Specify type as Simple, Simple Comminuted, Compound, Compound Comminuted.
Use figures below to mark burns, soft tissue injuries, and amputations. Identify degree of burn as: 1st degree; 2d degree; 3d degree.
List all injuries according to existing regulations.



Section D—DIAGNOSIS

Describe in detail, according to existing regulations, all injuries or abnormal conditions. Include length and depth of lacerations, exact description of injury site, etc. Include comment on psychic or emotional effects, shock, etc., apparent at time of this report.

Section E—STRUCTURES AND EQUIPMENT

Describe fully all aircraft structures or equipment which contributed to the injuries identified in Sections C and D hereof. Include any recommendations for changes leading to prevention of similar injuries.

Unknown

Section F—TREATMENT AND COMPLICATIONS

Describe treatment given... i.e., repair of lacerations, open reduction of fractures, etc. Describe any complications and list any significant sequelae.

N/A

Section G—USE THIS SPACE FOR REPORT OF AUTOPSY OR FOR ANY EXTENSIONS OF PRECEDING SECTIONS

(USE ADDITIONAL SHEETS AS NECESSARY)

(b) (6)

DATE
29 Oct 56

GRADE
Captain

(b) (6)

FLIGHT SURGEON OR AME

AME

MEDICAL REPORT OF AN INDIVIDUAL INVOLVED IN
AN AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT

Use this form in accordance with AF Reg. 62-14 and AF Manual 62-5, "Aircraft Accident Prevention-Investigation, Reporting. If additional space is needed, use Section F herein and/or additional sheet(s) as necessary, identifying by proper section letter.

Section A—GENERAL INFORMATION

LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME		2. SERVICE NR.	3. DATE OF ACCIDENT	4. CURRENT RATING	5. FLIGHT DUTY AT TIME OF ACCIDENT
STONE, HERMAN MILTON		(b) (6)	10 Oct 56	Fit Eng.	Fit Eng.
7. PILOT AFSC		8. WAS PILOT ON FLYING STATUS WITH WAIVER?		DATE GRANTED	
Primary Duty		Yes	No		
9. DATE OF LAST PHYSICAL EXAM FOR FLYING					
Class I: III 2 July 56		Actual		Estimated	
Class II:		Explained:			
Before (Specify)					
10. DAYS HOSPITALIZED (If none indicate)		Ex:	Actual:		
H/A					
11. DAYS IN-QUARTERS: Ex:		Actual:			
12. IF FATAL, TIME AND DATE OF DEATH					
13. WAS AUTOPSY PERFORMED?					
Yes		No		H/A	
				Report fully in Section F.	
14. SPECIFY PRIMARY INJURY OR PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH					
Unknown					
15. MEANS USED TO IDENTIFY BODY					
H/A					

Section B—PERSONAL FACTORS (Pilot or Crew Member Only)

One or more checks should be given for items 1 through 8 below. A narrative statement giving the information on which each check is based is desirable.

HOW DID THE MAN REACT DURING THE ACCIDENT-SEQUENCE?

(Check-one)

Happened too quickly for corrective action

No corrective action taken due to failure to recognize the situation.

Facility normative action taken due to emotional surges.

Inadequate corrective action taken due to faulty judgment.

Remained calm but took adequate corrective action too late.

Could not obtain information (fatality, etc.).

Other (Explain)

For additional information:

2. Did the man demonstrate a tendency toward any of the following?

Before Accident	Immediately Following (12 hrs.)	Over 24 Hrs. Later	Before Accident	Immediately Following (12 hrs.)	Over 24 Hrs. Later
		Excessive anxiety			Excessive elation
		Guilt feeling			Feeling of persecution
		Obsessive compulsive behavior			Amnesia
		Phobic reactions			Orienteation for time, place or person
		Psychosomatic complaints		X	Use of alcohol or drugs (explain)
		Abnormal fatigue (neurotic)		X	Unable to determine (fatality, etc.)
		Withdrawal behavior	X		No abnormal reaction
		Depression			Other (Specify)

Foto: mgb/Contrasto - Agf

Section B—PERSONAL FACTORS (Continued)

Check Factors in Human Error Which Could Have Caused or Contributed to the Accident. Check as many as necessary.

3. EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING

- Limited experience this type aircraft
- Lack of recent experience this type aircraft
- Inadequate training for accident cause factor
- Other (explain)

- Experience and training not a factor
- Could not be determined (fatality, etc.)

4. SUPERVISION [applies to both air and ground activities]

- Ordered on flight plan beyond ability
- Led into flight conditions beyond ability
- Inadequate briefing
- Poor crew coordination
- Malassigned
- Other (explain)
- No supervision factors involved
- Could not be determined (fatality, etc.)

5. PRE-FLIGHT FACTORS

- Faulty flight plan
- Failed to anticipate possible hazards
- Inadequate aircraft preflight check
- Not in proper physical or mental condition
- Other (explain)

- No faulty preflight factors involved
- Could not be determined (fatality, etc.)

6. IN-FLIGHT FACTORS

- Faulty decision
 - Use of controls
 - Flight procedure
 - Route or weather
 - Other (explain)
- Faulty interpretation
 - Tower or other instructions
 - Instrument, lights and cockpit items
 - Outside conditions (closing speed, etc.)
 - Other (explain)
- Faulty technique

40

Faulty attention

- Low level (inattention)
- Inadequate vision (channelized, attention)

- Distracted
- Faulty anticipation
- Other (explain)

Faulty attitude

- Overconfidence
- Excessive apprehension
- Excessive motivation (desire to get home, etc.)
- Poor motivation (poor morale, etc.)
- Other (explain)

- Poor physical condition (fatigue, etc.)

- Deficiencies in cockpit or instruments

- Other (explain)

No in-flight factors involved

- Could not be determined (fatality, etc.)

7. RELATED FACTORS

- Concern over military status
- Lack of confidence in leadership
- Lack of confidence in aircraft
- Recent near accidents, accidents, etc.
- Family difficulties
- Financial worries
- Living conditions
- Philosophical or religious conflicts
- Other (explain)
- Not a factor

- Could not be determined (fatality, etc.)

8. MARITAL STATUS

- Single
- Divorced

- Married
- Engaged

9. PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING

Date last course completed **8 June 56**

Date of last mask fitting

Fitted by whom

10. POST ACCIDENT TESTS

Accomplished How Long After Accident
(in hours)

RESULTS: (Specify names of tests used)

Blood

CO (Percent saturation)

Alcohol

Other (Specify)

Visual Tests

Other tests


Other (Specify)

■/■

11. ADDITIONAL PERSONAL FACTORS:

Section C—FRACTURES, BURNS, AND AMPUTATIONS

Use Skeletal Chart below to mark exact site of fractures. Specify type as Simple, Simple Commminated, Compound, Compound Commminated. Use figures below to mark burns, soft tissue injuries, and amputations. Identify degree of burn as: 1st degree; 2d degree; 3d degree. List all injuries according to existing regulations.



Section D—DIAGNOSIS

Describe in detail, according to existing regulations, all injuries or abnormal conditions. Include length and depth of lacerations, exact description of injury site, etc. Include comment on psychic or emotional effects, shock, etc., apparent at time of this report.

Section E—STRUCTURES AND EQUIPMENT

* Describe fully all aircraft structures or equipment which contributed to the injuries identified in Sections C and D hereof. Include any recommendations for changes leading to prevention of similar injuries.

Unknown

Section F—TREATMENT AND COMPLICATIONS

Describe treatment given, i. e., repair of lacerations, open reduction of fractures, etc. Describe any complications and list any significant sequelae.

N/A

Section G—USE THIS SPACE FOR REPORT OF AUTOPSY OR FOR ANY EXTENSIONS OF PRECEDING SECTIONS

(USE ADDITIONAL SHEETS AS NECESSARY)

DATE 29 Oct 56	GRADE Captain	FLIGHT SURGEON OR AME (b) (6)	(b) (6)
AF FORM 14b 1 FEB 56		Previous editions of this form may be used.	

**MEDICAL REPORT OF AN INDIVIDUAL INVOLVED IN
AF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT**

Use this form in accordance with AF Reg. 62-14 and AF Manual 62-5, "Aircraft Accident Prevention Investigation Reporting." If additional space is needed, use Section F hereof and/or additional sheet(s), as necessary, identifying by month, year, and page.

Section A—GENERAL INFORMATION

1. LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME		2. SERVICE NR.	3. DATE OF ACCIDENT	4. CURRENT RATING AND DATE	5. FLIGHT DUTY AT TIME OF ACCIDENT
McLENNING ROBERT WAYNE		(b) (6)	10 Oct '56	Flt Attend	Flt Attend
6. DATE OF BIRTH	7. PILOT'S AFSC	8. WAS PILOT ON FLYING STATUS WITH WAIVER?		DATE GRANTED	FOR WHAT DEFECT?
(b) (6)	Primary	Duty	Yes	No	
DATE OF LAST PHYSICAL EXAM. FOR FLYING					
Class I					
Class II III 16 May 56					
Defects (Specify)					
11. DAYS HOSPITALIZED: Ex. Actual [If none indicate] N/A		12. IF FATAL, TIME AND DATE OF DEATH 10 Oct 56 Time Unknown		13. WAS AUTOPSY PERFORMED? Yes No N/A Report fully in Section F	
14. SPECIFY PRIMARY INJURY OR PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH Unknown		15. MEANS USED TO IDENTIFY BODY N/A			

Section B—PERSONAL FACTORS (Pilot or Crew Member Only)

One or more checks should be given for items 1 through 8 below. A narrative statement may be furnished in response to any question.

1. HOW DID THE MAN REACT DURING THE ACCIDENT SEQUENCE?

1500-1501

- Hesitated**: fail quickly for corrective action.
 - No corrective action taken**: due to failure to recognize the situation.
 - Faulty corrective action taken**: due to emotional reasoning.

Inadequate corrective action taken due to faults

Remained calm but took adequate corrective action to do

X Could not obtain information (Intelite, etc.)

Other (England)

43

2. Did the man demonstrate a tendency toward any of the following?

For additional resources

Section B—PERSONAL FACTORS (Continued)

Check Factors in Human Error Which Could Have Caused or Contributed to the Accident. Check as many as necessary.

3. EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING

- Limited experience this type aircraft
- Lack of recent experience this type aircraft
- Inadequate training for accident cause factor
- Other (explain) _____

- Experience and training not a factor
- Could not be determined (fatality, etc.)

4. SUPERVISION (applies to both air and ground activities)

- Ordered on flight plan beyond ability
- Led into flight conditions beyond ability
- Inadequate briefing
- Poor crew coordination

Malassigned

Other (explain) _____

No supervision factors involved

- Could not be determined (fatality, etc.)

5. PRE-FLIGHT FACTORS

- Faulty flight plan
- Failed to anticipate possible hazards
- Inadequate aircraft preflight check
- Not in proper physical or mental condition
- Other (explain) _____

- No fault preflight factors involved

Could not be determined (fatality, etc.)

6. IN-FLIGHT FACTORS

- Faulty decision
- Use of controls
- Flight procedure
- Route or weather
- Other (explain) _____

Faulty interpretation

- Tower or other instructions
- Instrument, lights and cockpit items
- Outside conditions (closing speed, etc.)
- Other (explain) _____

Faulty technique

Faulty attention

Low level (inattention)

Inadequate vision (channelized attention)

Distracted

Faulty anticipation

Other (explain) _____

Faulty attitude

Overconfidence

Excessive apprehension

Excessive motivation (desire to get home, etc.)

Poor motivation (poor morale, etc.)

Other (explain) _____

Poor physical condition (fatigue, etc.)

Deficiencies in cockpit or instruments

Other (explain) _____

No in-flight factors involved

- Could not be determined (fatality, etc.)

7. RELATED FACTORS

Concern over military status

Lack of confidence in leadership

Lack of confidence in aircraft

Recent near accidents, accidents, etc.

Family difficulties

Financial worries

Living conditions

Philosophical or religious conflicts

Other (explain) _____

Not a factor

- Could not be determined (fatality, etc.)

8. MARITAL STATUS

Single

Divorced

Married

Engaged

9. PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING

Date last course completed **21 May 56**

Date of last mask fitting

Fitted by whom _____

10. POST-ACCIDENT TESTS

Accomplished How Long After Accident
(in hours)

RESULTS: (Specify names of tests used)

Blood

- CO (Percent saturation)
- Alcohol
- Other (Specify) _____

Visual Tests

- Other tests

Other (Specify) _____


N/A



11. ADDITIONAL PERSONAL FACTORS:

Section C—FRACTURES, BURNS, AND AMPUTATIONS

Use Skeletal Chart below to mark exact site of fractures. Specify type as Simple, Simple Comminuted, Compound, Compound Comminuted. Use figures below to mark burns, soft tissue injuries, and amputations. Identify degree of burn as: 1st degree; 2d degree; 3d degree. List all injuries according to existing regulations.



Section D—DIAGNOSIS

Describe in detail, according to existing regulations, all injuries or abnormal conditions. Include length and depth of lacerations, exact description of injury site, etc. Include comment on psychic or emotional effects, shock, etc., apparent at time of this report.

Section E—STRUCTURES AND EQUIPMENT

Describe fully all aircraft structures or equipment which contributed to the injuries identified in Sections C and D hereto. Include any recommendations for changes leading to prevention of similar injuries.

Unknown

Section F—TREATMENT AND COMPLICATIONS

Describe treatment given, i.e., repair of lacerations, open reduction of fractures, etc. Describe any complications and list any significant sequelae.

N/A

Section G—USE THIS SPACE FOR REPORT OF AUTOPSY OR FOR ANY EXTENSIONS OF PRECEDING SECTIONS

DATE 29 Oct 56				GRADE Captain	FLIGHT SURGEON OR LINE (b) (6)	AME (b) (6)
[USE ADDITIONAL SHEETS AS NECESSARY]						

MEDICAL REPORT OF AN INDIVIDUAL INVOLVED IN
AF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT

Use this Form in accordance with AF Reg. 82-14 and AF Manual 82-5, "Aircraft Accident Prevention-Investigation-Reporting. If additional space is needed, use Section F hereof and/or additional sheet(s) as necessary, identifying by proper section letter.

Section A—GENERAL INFORMATION

1. LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME		2. SERVICE NR.	3. DATE OF ACCIDENT	4. CURRENT RATING AND DATE	5. FLIGHT DUTY AT TIME OF ACCIDENT
RIMBLER JAMES JOSEPH		(b) (6)	10 Oct 56	Ft. Attend.	Flt Attend.
6. DATE OF BIRTH	7. PILOT'S AFSC	8. WAS PILOT ON FLYING STATUS WITH WAIVER?	DATE GRANTED	FOR WHAT DEFECT?	
(b) (6)	Primary. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Duty <input type="checkbox"/>	Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/>	-	-	
9. DATE OF LAST PHYSICAL EXAM FOR FLYING					
Class I			10. NUMBER OF DAYS RESTRICTED FROM FLYING AS RESULT OF THIS ACCIDENT		
Class II III 18 Oct 55			Actual	Estimated	
Defects (Specify)					
11. DAYS HOSPITALIZED [If none indicate]		Est. <input type="checkbox"/> Actual <input type="checkbox"/>	12. IF FATAL, TIME AND DATE OF DEATH	13. WAS AUTOPSY PERFORMED?	
14. DAYS IN QUARTERS		Est. <input type="checkbox"/> Actual <input type="checkbox"/>	Time 10 Oct 56 Unknown	Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Report fully in Section F.	
15. MEANS USED TO IDENTIFY BODY					
Unknown			N/A	J	

Section B—PERSONAL FACTORS (Pilot or Crew Member Only)

One or more checks should be given for items 1 through 8 below. A narrative statement giving the information on which each check is based is desirable.

I. HOW DID THE MAN REACT DURING THE ACCIDENT SEQUENCE?

(Check one)

Happened too quickly for corrective action.

No corrective action taken due to failure to recognise the situation.

Faulty corrective action taken due to emotional confusion.

Inadequate corrective action taken due to faulty judgment.

Remained calm but took adequate corrective action too late.

Could not obtain information (fatality, etc.)

Other (Specify)

From additional monitoring

47

Did the judge demonstrate a tendency toward any of the following?

[View additional publications](#)

Section B—PERSONAL FACTORS (Continued)

Check Factors in Human Errors Which Could Have Caused or Contributed to the Accident. Check as many as necessary.

3. EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING

- Limited experience this type aircraft
- Lack of recent experience this type aircraft
- Inadequate training for accident cause factor
- Other (explain) _____

Experience and training not a factor

- Could not be determined (fatality, etc.)

4. SUPERVISION (applies to both air and ground activities)

- Ordered on flight plan beyond ability
- Led into flight conditions beyond ability
- Inadequate briefing
- Poor crew coordination
- Malassigned
- Other (explain) _____

No supervision factors involved

- Could not be determined (fatality, etc.)

5. PRE-FLIGHT FACTORS

- Faulty flight plan
- Failed to anticipate possible hazards
- Inadequate aircraft preflight check
- Not in proper physical or mental condition
- Other (explain) _____

No faulty preflight factors involved

- Could not be determined (fatality, etc.)

6. IN-FLIGHT FACTORS

- Faulty decision
 - Use of controls
 - Flight procedure
 - Route or weather
 - Other (explain) _____
- Faulty interpretation
 - Tower or other instructions
 - Instrument, lights and cockpit items
 - Outside conditions (closing speed, etc.)
 - Other (explain) _____
- Faulty technique

Faulty attention

- Low level (inattention)
- Inadequate vision (channelized attention)
- Distracted
- Faulty anticipation
- Other (explain) _____

Faulty attitude

- Overconfidence
- Excessive apprehension
- Excessive motivation (desire to get home, etc.)
- Poor motivation (poor morale, etc.)
- Other (explain) _____

Poor physical condition (fatigue, etc.)

Deficiencies in cockpit or instruments

Other (explain) _____

No in-flight factors involved

Could not be determined (fatality, etc.)

7. RELATED FACTORS

- Concern over military status
- Lack of confidence in leadership
- Lack of confidence in aircraft
- Recent near accidents, accidents, etc.
- Family difficulties
- Financial worries
- Living conditions
- Philosophical or religious conflicts
- Other (explain) _____

8. MARITAL STATUS

- | | |
|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Single | <input type="checkbox"/> Divorced |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Married | <input type="checkbox"/> Engaged |

9. PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING

Date last course completed **March 1956**

Date of last mask fitting


Fitted by whom

10. POST ACCIDENT TESTS	Accomplished How Long After Accident (in hours)	RESULTS: (Specify names of tests used)
Blood CO (Percent saturation) Alcohol Other (Specify) Visual Tests Other tests Other (Specify)	N/A	

11. ADDITIONAL PERSONAL FACTORS:

Section C—FRACTURES, BURNS, AND AMPUTATIONS

Use Skeletal Chart below to mark exact site of fractures. Specify type as Simple, Simple Comminuted, Compound, Compound Comminuted. Use figures below to mark burns, soft tissue injuries, and amputations. Identify degree of burn as: 1st degree; 2d degree; 3d degree. List all injuries according to existing regulations.



Section D—DIAGNOSIS

Describe in detail, according to existing regulations, all injuries or abnormal conditions. Include length and depth of lacerations, exact description of injury site, etc. Include comment on psychic or emotional effects, shock, etc., apparent at time of this report.

Section E—STRUCTURES AND EQUIPMENT

Describe fully all aircraft structures or equipment which contributed to the injuries identified in Sections C and D hereof. Include any recommendations for changes leading to prevention of similar injuries.

Unknown

Section F—TREATMENT AND COMPLICATIONS

Describe treatment given, e., repair of lacerations, open reduction of fractures, etc. Describe any complications and list any significant sequelae.

N/A

Section G—USE THIS SPACE FOR REPORT OF AUTOPSY OR FOR ANY EXTENSIONS OF PRECEDING SECTIONS

50

(USE ADDITIONAL SHEETS AS NECESSARY)

DATE 29Oct56	GRADE Captain	FLIGHT SURGEON OR ANE (b) (6)	AME (b) (6)
------------------------	-------------------------	---	-----------------------

**MEDICAL REPORT OF AN INDIVIDUAL INVOLVED IN
AF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT**

Use this form in accordance with AF Reg. 62-14 and AF Manual 62-5, "Aircraft Accident Prevention-Investigation-Reporting". If additional space is needed, use Section F hereof and/or additional sheet(s) as necessary, identifying by proper section letter.

Section A—GENERAL INFORMATION

1. LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME	2. SERVICE NR.	3. DATE OF ACCIDENT	4. CURRENT RATING	5. FLIGHT DUTY AT TIME OF ACCIDENT
MURKIN ROBERT JOSEPH	(b) (6)	10 Oct 56	Radio Oper	Rad. Oper
6. DATE OF BIRTH	7. PILOT'S AGE:	8. WAS PILOT ON FLYING STATUS WITH WAIVER?	FOR WHAT DEFECT?	
(b) (6)	Primary Duty	Yes No		
9. DATE OF LAST PHYSICAL EXAM. FOR FLYING	10. NUMBER OF DAYS RESTRICTED FROM FLYING AS RESULT OF THIS ACCIDENT			
Class I: III 31 Oct 55	Actual:	Estimated		
Defects [Specify]:	Explain: N/A			
11. DAYS HOSPITALIZED: Est. Actual	12. IF FATAL, TIME AND DATE OF DEATH		13. WAS AUTOPSY PERFORMED?	
(If none indicate) N/A	Time	10 Oct 56	Yes No	N/A
DAYS IN QUARTERS: Est. Actual	Report fully in Section F.			
14. SPECIFY PRIMARY INJURY OR PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH	15. MEANS USED TO IDENTIFY BODY			
Unknown	N/A			

Section B—PERSONAL FACTORS (Pilot or Crew Member Only)

One or more checks should be given for items 1 through 8 below. A narrative statement giving the information on which each check is based is desirable.

1. HOW DID THE MAN REACT DURING THE ACCIDENT SEQUENCE? (Check one)	Inadequate corrective action taken due to faulty judgment.
Happened too quickly for corrective action.	Remained calm but took adequate corrective action too late.
No corrective action taken due to failure to recognize the situation.	Could not obtain information (fatality, etc.).
Faulty corrective action taken due to emotional confusion.	Other (Explain)
For additional narrative	

51

2. Did the man demonstrate a tendency toward any of the following?				
Before Accident	Immediately Following (12 hrs.)	Over 24 Hrs. Later	Before Accident	Immediately Following (12 hrs.)
				Over 24 Hrs. Later
Excessive anxiety				
Guilt feeling				
Obsessive compulsive behavior				
Phobic reactions				
Psychosomatic complaints				
Abnormal fatigue (neurotic)				
Withdrawal behavior				
Depression				
Excessive elation				
Feeling of persecution				
Amnesia				
Disorientation (in time, place or person)				
Use of alcohol or drugs (explain)				
Unable to determine (fatality, etc.)				
No abnormal reaction				
Other (Specify)				
For additional narrative				

6 10 10 1 54

Section B—PERSONAL FACTORS (Continued)

Check Factors in Human Error Which Could Have Caused or Contributed to the Accident. Check as many as necessary.

3. EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING

- Limited experience this type aircraft
- Lack of recent experience this type aircraft
- Inadequate training for accident cause factor
- Other (explain) _____

- Experience and training not a factor
- Could not be determined (fatality, etc.)

4. SUPERVISION (applies to both air and ground activities)

- Ordered on flight plan beyond ability
- Led into flight conditions beyond ability
- Inadequate briefing
- Poor crew coordination
- Malassigned
- Other (explain) _____

- No supervision factors involved

- Could not be determined (fatality, etc.)

5. PRE-FLIGHT FACTORS

- Faulty flight plan
- Failed to anticipate possible hazards
- Inadequate aircraft preflight check
- Not in proper physical or mental condition
- Other (explain) _____

- No faulty preflight factors involved
- Could not be determined (fatality, etc.)

6. IN-FLIGHT FACTORS

- Faulty decision
- Use of controls
- Flight procedure
- Route or weather
- Other (explain) _____

- Faulty interpretation
- Tower or other instructions
- Instrument, lights and cockpit items
- Outside conditions (closing speed, etc.)
- Other (explain) _____

- Faulty technique

Faulty attention

- Low level (inattention)
- Inadequate vision (channelized attention)
- Distracted
- Faulty anticipation
- Other (explain) _____

Faulty attitude

- Overconfidence
- Excessive apprehension
- Excessive motivation (desire to get home, etc.)
- Poor motivation (poor morale, etc.)
- Other (explain) _____

Poor physical condition (fatigue, etc.)

- Deficiencies in cockpit or instruments
- Other (explain) _____

No in-flight factors involved

- Could not be determined (fatality, etc.)

7. RELATED FACTORS

- Concern over military status
- Lack of confidence in leadership
- Lack of confidence in aircraft
- Recent near accidents, accidents, etc.
- Family difficulties
- Financial worries
- Living conditions
- Philosophical or religious conflicts
- Other (explain) _____

Not a factor

- Could not be determined (fatality, etc.)

8. MARITAL STATUS

- Single
- Married
- Divorced
- Engaged

9. PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING

Date last course completed **8 Jun 56**

Date of last mask fitting


Fitted by whom

10. POST-ACCIDENT TESTS	Accomplished How Long After Accident (in hours)	RESULTS: (Specify names of tests used)
Blood CO (Percent saturation) Alcohol Other (Specify) Visual Tests Other tests Other (Specify)	N/A	

II. ADDITIONAL PERSONAL FACTORS:

Section C—FRACTURES, BURNS, AND AMPUTATIONS

Use Skeletal Chart below to mark exact site of fractures. Specify type as Simple, Simple Comminuted, Compound, Compound Comminuted.
Use Figures below to mark burns, soft tissue injuries, and amputations. Identify degree of burn as: 1st degree, 2d degree, 3d degree.
List all injuries according to existing regulations.



Section D—DIAGNOSIS

Describe in detail, according to existing regulations, all injuries or abnormal conditions. Include length and depth of lacerations, exact description of injury site, etc. Include comment on psychis or emotional effects, shock, etc., apparent at time of this report.

Section E—STRUCTURES AND EQUIPMENT

Describe fully all aircraft structures or equipment which contributed to the injuries identified in Sections C and D hereof. Include any recommendations for changes leading to prevention of similar injuries.

Unknown

Section F—TREATMENT AND COMPLICATIONS

Describe treatment given, - i.e., repair of lacerations; open reduction of fractures, etc. Describe any complications and list any significant sequelae.

N/A

Section G—USE THIS SPACE FOR REPORT OF AUTOPSY OR FOR ANY EXTENSIONS OF PRECEDING SECTIONS

VC
54

(USE ADDITIONAL SHEETS AS NECESSARY)

DATE 29 Oct 56	GRADE Captain	(b) (6)	FLIGHT SURGEON OR AME AME	(b) (6)
-------------------	------------------	---------	------------------------------	---------

MEDICAL REPORT OF AN INDIVIDUAL INVOLVED IN
AF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT

Use this form in accordance with AF Reg. 62-14 and AF Manual 62-5, "Aircraft Accident Prevention Investigation Reporting". If additional space is needed, use Section F hereof and/or additional sheet(s) as necessary, identifying by proper section number.

Section A—GENERAL INFORMATION

1. LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME		2. SERVICE NR.	3. DATE OF ACCIDENT	4. CURRENT RATING AND DATE	5. FLIGHT DUTY AT TIME OF ACCIDENT
JOKELA, ROGER ALLEN		(b) (6)	10 Oct 56	Rad. Trainee	Rad. Oper
6. DATE OF BIRTH	7. PILOT'S AFSC	8. WAS PILOT ON FLYING DATE GRANTED STATUS WITH WAIVER?			9. FOR WHAT DEFECT?
(b) (6)	Primary - Duty -	Yes -	No -	-	-
10. DATE OF LAST PHYSICAL EXAM. FOR FLYING			11. NUMBER OF DAYS RESTRICTED FROM FLYING AS RESULT OF THIS ACCIDENT		
Class I	Actual	Explained	H/A	Estimated	
Class II	III 17 Sep 56				
Defects (Specify)					
11. DAYS HOSPITALIZED (If none indicate)		Ex. Actual	12. IF FATAL, TIME AND DATE OF DEATH		13. WAS AUTOPSY PERFORMED? Yes No
H/A			Time 10 Oct 56	Unknown	H/A
14. DAYS IN QUARTERS		Ex. Actual	Report Fully in Section F		
14. SPECIFY PRIMARY INJURY OR PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH			15. MEANS USED TO IDENTIFY BODY		
Unknown			2	H/A	

Section B—PERSONAL FACTORS (Pilot or Crew Member Only)

One or more checks should be present for items 1 through 8 below. A narrative statement giving the information on which each check is based is desirable.

- 1. HOW DID THE MAN REACT DURING THE ACCIDENT SEQUENCE?**

{Check one!}

Happened too quickly for corrective action.

No corrective action taken due to failure to recognize the situation

¹Faulty corrective action taken due to emotional aggression.

Inadequate corrective action taken due to faulty judgment.

Remained calm but took adequate corrective action too late.

X Could not obtain information (fatality, etc.) -

Other (Explain)

For additional resources

55

3. Did the man demonstrate a tendency toward any of the following?

For additional information

Section B—PERSONAL FACTORS (Continued)

Check Factors in Human Error Which Could Have Caused or Contributed to the Accident. Check as many as necessary.

3. EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING

- Limited experience this type aircraft
- Lack of recent experience this type aircraft
- Inadequate training for accident cause factor
- Other [explain]
- Experience and training not a factor
- Could not be determined (fatality, etc.)

4. SUPERVISION (applies to both air and ground activities)

- Ordered on flight plan beyond ability
- Led into flight conditions beyond ability
- Inadequate briefing
- Poor crew coordination
- Malassigned
- Other [explain]
- No supervision factors involved
- Could not be determined (fatality, etc.)

5. PRE-FLIGHT FACTORS

- Faulty flight plan
- Failed to anticipate possible hazards
- Inadequate aircraft preflight check
- Not in proper physical or mental condition
- Other [explain]
- No faulty preflight factors involved
- Could not be determined (fatality, etc.)

6. IN-FLIGHT FACTORS

- Faulty decision
- Use of controls
- Flight procedure
- Route or weather
- Other [explain]
- Faulty interpretation
- Tower or other instructions
- Instrument, lights and cockpit items
- Outside conditions (closing speed, etc.)
- Other [explain]
- Faulty technique

Faulty attention

- Low level (inattention)
- Inadequate vision (channelized attention)

Distracted

Faulty anticipation

Other [explain]

Faulty attitude

- Overconfidence
- Excessive apprehension
- Excessive motivation (desire to get home, etc.)
- Poor motivation (poor morale, etc.)
- Other [explain]
- Poor physical condition (fatigue, etc.)
- Deficiencies in cockpit or instruments
- Other [explain]
- No in-flight factors involved
- Could not be determined (fatality, etc.)

7. RELATED FACTORS

- Concern over military status
- Lack of confidence in leadership
- Lack of confidence in aircraft
- Recent near accidents, accidents, etc.
- Family difficulties
- Financial worries
- Living conditions
- Philosophical or religious conflicts
- Other [explain]
- Not a factor
- Could not be determined (fatality, etc.)

8. MARITAL STATUS

- Single
- Divorced
- Married
- Engaged

9. PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING

- Date last course completed
- Date of last mask fitting
- Fitted by whom


9 June 56

10. POST ACCIDENT TESTS	Accomplished How Long After Accident [in hours]	RESULTS: (Specify names of tests used)
Blood <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CO (Percent saturation) <input type="checkbox"/> Alcohol <input type="checkbox"/> Other [Specify] Visual Tests <input type="checkbox"/> Other tests <input type="checkbox"/> Other [Specify]	<i>S/A</i>	

11. ADDITIONAL PERSONAL FACTORS:

Section C—FRACTURES, BURNS, AND AMPUTATIONS

Use Skeletal Chart below to mark exact site of fractures. Specify type as Simple, Simple Comminuted, Compound, Compound Comminuted.
Use figures below to mark burns, soft tissue injuries, and amputations. Identify degree of burn as: 1st degree, 2d degree, 3d degree.
List all injuries according to existing regulations.



Section D—DIAGNOSIS

Describe in detail, according to existing regulations, all injuries or abnormal conditions. Include length and depth of lacerations, exact description of injury site, etc. Include comment on psychic or emotional effects, shock, etc., apparent at time of this report.

Section E—STRUCTURES AND EQUIPMENT

Describe fully all aircraft structures or equipment which contributed to the injuries identified in Sections C and D hereof. Include any recommendations for changes leading to prevention of similar injuries.

Unknown

Section F—TREATMENT AND COMPLICATIONS

Describe treatment given, i. e., repair of lacerations, open reduction of fractures, etc. Describe any complications and list any significant sequelae.

N/A

Section G—USE THIS SPACE FOR REPORT OF AUTOPSY OR FOR ANY EXTENSIONS OF PRECEDING SECTIONS

(USE ADDITIONAL SHEETS AS NEEDED)

(b) (6)

DATE
Oct 36

GRADE
Captain

(b) (6)

FLIGHT SURGEON OR AMB

AMB

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE OFFICER'S REPORT

Use this form in accordance with AF Reg. 62-14 and AF Manual 62-5, "Aircraft Accident Prevention Manual"
when AF Aircraft Accident/Incident Involves Inadequacy, Malfunction, or Failure of AF Materiel.

Section A—GENERAL INFORMATION

1. Date of accident	2. Type and model of aircraft involved	3. Aircraft Nr.	4. Place of accident	5. Base investigating accident
10 October 1956	R6D-1	131588	Atlantic Ocean	1611th ATW McGuire AFB, NJ

Section B—AIRCRAFT HISTORY, AIRFRAME COMPONENTS AND AIRCRAFT ACCESSORIES DATA

Complete the following when material failure, inadequacy or malfunction are known or suspected cause factors.

1. Date of accident acceptance of aircraft Navy 28 January 1953	2. Total airframe hours 5597.0	3. Date last overhaul 24 February 1956
4. Overhauling activity Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, Texas	5. Aircraft hours since overhaul 1271.0	6. Date and type of last periodic inspection 3 October 1956 Intermediate Check
7. Aircraft hours at last periodic inspection 5559.0	8. Name, part number and position on aircraft or part contributing to accident Unknown	
9. Is part available for analysis? NO	YES (If yes) Where located Unknown	
10. Date of Air Force acceptance of part ---	11. Date part last installed ---	12. Date part last overhauled ---
13. Last overhaul activity ---	14. Total flight hours of part ---	15. Total flight hours of part at last inspection ---

Section C—FIRES AND EXPLOSIONS

1. Did fire occur? YES Unknown NO Before impact _____ After impact _____ If yes, discuss in Section F.	2. Did explosion occur? YES Unknown NO Before impact _____ After impact _____ If yes, discuss in Section F.	3. Was aircraft fire detection system activated? YES Unknown NO (If yes, give type and manufacturer)
4. Was aircraft fixed fire extinguishing system used? (If yes, give type and manufacturer) Unknown		

Section D—POWER PLANT HISTORY

Complete the following when applicable for engines, afterburners, propellers, turbo-superchargers, helicopter rotors and/or any other power plant components involved. Use a separate column for each component. Complete a separate column for each engine when specific engine(s) involved; an accident cause factor involving engine(s) is undetermined.

1. Name of component	Aircraft Engine	Aircraft Engine	Aircraft Engine	Aircraft Engine
2. Location (if applicable) No. 1, 2, etc.	1	2	3	4
3. Model or Part Number	R2800-52W	R2800-52W	R2800-52W	R2800-52W
4. Serial Number (if applicable)	NK510201	NK510022	P32103	NK510020
5. Manufacturer (or licensee)	Nash Kelvinator	Nash Kelvinator	Pratt & Whitney	Nash Kelvinator
6. Total hours	1626.6	2801.6	3323.0	3045.8
7. Number of major overhauls	1	2	2	2
8. Hours since last major overhaul	166.6	662.4	947.6	168.8
9. Date of last overhaul	25 Jun 55	7 Dec 55	28 Mar 56	18 Apr 56
10. Overhaul activity	OOAMA	NAS SAN DIEGO	SAN DIEGO	NAS SAN DIEGO
11. Date last installed	5 Aug 56	5 Jun 56	18 Apr 56	6 Jul 56
12. Hours since last installed	166.6	480.8	947.6	168.8
13. Date of last periodic inspection	3 Oct 56	3 Oct 56	3 Oct 56	3 Oct 56
14. Type of last periodic inspection	Intermediate	Intermediate	Intermediate	Intermediate
15. Fuel (Type or octane rating)	115/115	115/115	115/115	115/115

Section E—POWER PLANT OPERATION DATA

Complete the following when available.

1. Sequence of failure(s) by nozzle position (3, 1, etc.)	2. Time interval between failures (For multiple failures)	3. Altitude failure(s) occurred	4. Outside air temp(s)
---	--	------------------------------------	------------------------

DATA ON FAILED ENGINES

Engine factors	Prior to failure of first engine	Prior to failure of second engine	Prior to failure of third engine	REMARKS
1. R. P. M.				
2. Manifold pressure				
3. Torque readings				
4. Oil pressure				
5. Oil temperature				
6. Oil quantity				
7. Cylinder head temperature				
8. Fuel mixture setting				
9. Fuel pressure				
10. Fuel flow				
11. Carburetor preheat setting				
12. Carburetor air temperature				
13. Other				
14. Percent R. P. M.				
15. Exhaust gas temperature				
16. Emergency fuel control setting				
17. Afterburner settings				
18. Afterburner eyelid position				
19. Anti-ice status				
20. Inlet screen position				
21. Other				

RECIPROCATING

TURBO-JET

Section F—AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE OFFICER'S ANALYSIS

Describe difficulties involved and relationship of the various components above to the accident. Include any additional information or opinion of possible value to future technical analysis of this report. Continuation on plain paper sheets should be attached when necessary.

Aircraft crashed at sea under circumstances not established.

(b) (6)

FICER (signature)

HEADQUARTERS
McGuire Air Force Base
And
1611TH AIR BASE GROUP (MATS)
McGuire Air Force Base
Trenton, New Jersey

LITRO #467

15 October 1956

SUBJECT: Aircraft Accident Investigation Board

TO: Personnel Concerned

FNO, ORG INDC, this STA, are APT to an ACFTACDTINVESBD, to INVES ACDT of R6D, ACFT # BUNO 131588. (AUTH: AFR 62-14). This order W/B RESC upon COMPL of INVES. Concurrence respective COMDR.

Name	Organization
COL (b) (6)	(b) (6) (PRES)
COMDR (b) (6)	(b) (6) (MBR)
MAJ (b) (6)	(b) (6) (ACDTINVESO)
MAJ (b) (6)	(b) (6) (MBR)
CAPT (b) (6)	(b) (6) (MEDO)
LT (b) (6)	(b) (6) (MAINTO)
	HQ 1611th Air TRANSGWM
	VR-6
	HQ 1611th Air TRANSGWM
	18th Air TRANSONM
	1611th USAFDISP
	VR-6

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER:

(b) (6)

DISTRIBUTION:

20 - WGFS
5 - INDIVs concerned
5 - ORGs concerned
1 - File

CAPT USAF
Adjutant

80

AIRCRAFT CLEARANCE

(DELIVER DUPLICATES TO BASE OPERATIONS BY DESTINATION)

DATE

10 OCT 56

AIRCRAFT SERIAL NO.

31588

A. OPERATIONS OFFICE

LAKENHEATH RAF STA ENGLAND

B. OCCUPANTS (State whether crew or passenger. List additional passengers on separate sheet and attach.)

DUTY	NAME AND INITIALS	GRADE	SERVICE NO.	ORGANIZATION	HOME STATION
PILOT IN COMMAND	LONE F.B.	(b) (6)		VRG-USN	McGUIRE
				(b) (6)	(b) (6)

(SEE ATTACHED GND HLT)

AP 3
6/MARSH, MORA, OGAR FINN JET SSABURE C5-A CIAZ
(b) (6)

C.

FLIGHT PLAN

RADIO CALL		AIRCRAFT TYPE		POINT OF DEPARTURE	
Marshall		KC-135		BASE NAME OF DESTINATION	
ROUTE TO BE FLOWN				MILEAGE	
DIR	VTR	ALTITUDE	ROUTE	TO	NAUT ETD
		16000	D10	15000	EST TRUE A/S ETE
			D12	14000	KTS
			D14	13000	ETE TO ALTERNATE
			D15N 053E		
			1400	24 PLAINFIELD	
			1441	4903N 08W	
			2005	48N 0W	
			3-06	4523N 15W	
			4-08	43N 193EW	
			5-28	3955N 25W	
			6-55	2476S	
				PILOT'S LAST NAME	
				FUEL ON BOARD	
				11 HRS	20 MIN
INSTRUMENT RATING					
NAVY		AIR FORCE		ARMY	
SPECIAL PILOT		PILOT RATING		PILOT RATING	
STANDARD PILOT		INST RATING		INST RATING	
DATE INSTRUMENT CARD EXPIRES					
DD FORM 365F FILED AT					
HIGHEST RANK ON BOARD					

REMARKS

205 59

81

J.B. Facer

WEATHER FORECAST - RADIOS	DESTINATION		TIME OF OBS	DESTINATION (ETA)		SIGNATURE OF PILOT
	LAKENHEATH 250 900 10+10+20		1000 1200	250 900 10+10+20		
	INTERMEDIATE PHILIP AIRPORT 250 2500 15 00		1000 1200	INTERMEDIATE 250 2500 15 00		
	MIN CIG AT MAX CIG TOPS FT		THUNDERSTORMS	TURBC		
MIN VIS FT LVL		DUST OR HAZE	RAIN		HAIL	
MIN FZL LVL FT PSL		ICING	FOG			
WINDS SEE X-REF PAGE 12/37		FZL FCN	SNOW		BRIEFING VOID AFTER	

FLIGHT CLEARANCE AUTHORIZATION					
DISPATCHED TO	TIME	BY	(b) (6)		
-186	1420	55	(b) (6)		
INSTRUCTIONS AND APPROVAL TRANS. TO TOWER OR PILOT BY			ACTUAL I.O. TIME		
			1420		
ARRIVED ARRIVED AT		TIME	GRADE OR POSITION		
			1420 0545		

WEIGHT AND BALANCE CLEARANCE FORM F
 TRANSPORT
 (USE REVERSE FOR TACTICAL MISSIONS)

See Reference
 AF Form 360
 AFCAF Form P. 118 C
 50ME 8-51 (Rev 97)

FOR USE IN
 T. O. E-1B-40 &
 AN 01-E-1B-40

DATE	AIRCRAFT TYPE	FROM	HOME STATION					
10 OCT 56	R 60	MAIL						
MISSION/TO/FROM/THROUGH	SERIAL NO.	TO	PILOT					
1190	1588	CIA						
LIMITATIONS								
CONDITION	TAXKOFF	LANDING	REF					
TOTAL ALLOWABLE GROSS WEIGHT	107000	88200	1					
TOTAL AIRPLANE WEIGHT (Ref. 12)	57214		2					
OPERATING WEIGHT LESS ESTIMATED LANDING WEIGHT	74014		3					
OPERATING WEIGHT	74014		4					
ALLOWABLE LOAD (Ref. 10) ALLOWABLE PAYLOAD	16784	4186	5					
ALLOWABLE TAXKOFF	163	TO 1% M.A.C. or IN	6					
ALLOWABLE LOAD		TO 1% M.A.C. or IN	7					
	330		8					
	8770		9					
			10					
			11					
			12					
			DISTRIBUTION OF ALLOWABLE LOAD (PAYLOAD)					
			UPPER COMPARTMENTS	LOWER COMPARTMENTS				
			COMPT	PASSENGERS	COMPT	PASSENGERS	BAG'S GROSS	
			NO.	WEIGHT	NO.	WEIGHT		
			1	50 9902			9902	660
			2		BB		800	614
			3		CC		600	590
			4					
			5					
			6					
			7					
			8					
			9					
			10					
			11					
			12					
			13					
			14					
			15					
			16					
			17					
			18					
			19					
			20					
			21					
			COMPUTED BY					
			(b) (6)					
FINAL WEIGHT REMOVED	-	-	WEIGHT ADDED AUTH					
FINAL WEIGHT ADDED	+	+						
NET DIFFERENCE IN WEIGHT			PILOT	SIGNATURE				
				SIGNATURE				

FROM: CHABGRU 3910 RAF LAKENHEATH ENGLAND

TO: CHIEF OF STAFF USAF WASH DC
BUAER USAF WASHINGTON DC
OTIG USAF NORTON AFB CAL
COMDR USAFE WIERSBADEN GERMANY
COMATS ANDREWS AFB WASH DC
IN SAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR
COMATLIVMATS MCQUIRE AFB NJ
COMIR MCQUIRE AFB NJ
NAVAL SAFETY CENTER NORFOLK VA
SURGEON GENERAL USAF WASH 25 DC
COMIR AMC WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OHIO
COMDR 7AD SOUTH RUISLIP ENGLAND
COMIR ARDC BALTIMORE MD
COMIR WADC WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OHIO

83

UNCLAS/3910-B60 10-31-60. ATTN TIG SUBJECT PRELIMINARY REPORT OF MAJOR ACCIDENT.
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED LAW PAR 49 and 52 AFR 62-11.

- A. 10/2030Z
B. R6D-1 Series block No. 131588, Sqdn: VR-6, 1611th ATW, McGuire AFB NJ.
C. Unknown, Enroute Lakenheath England to Lajes Azores, last position report at
10/2030Z 4610N 1000W.
D. Unknown.
E. Aircraft Commander, Lowe, Fred E., (b) (6) /1315, LCDR, VR-6, 1611th ATW, ATLD,
MATS, McGuire AFB, NJ, Unknown, Unknown.
F. Willis, William A., (b) (6) /1310, LCDR, VR-6, 1611th ATW, ATLD, MATS, McGuire
AFB, NJ, Pilot; Cirbus, Dominic E., (b) (6) /1310, LTJG, VR-6, 1611th ATW, ATLD,
MATS, McGuire AFB, NJ, 1st Pilot; Smith, Frank A., (b) (6) AD2, VR-6, 1611th
ATW, ATLD, MATS, McGuire AFB, NJ, Flt Engr; Stone, Herman M., (b) (6) AD1,
VR-6, 1611th ATW, ATLD, MATS, McGuire AFB, NJ, Flt Engr (trainee); McClenning,
Robert W., (b) (6) AN, VR-6, 1611th ATW, ATLD, MATS, McGuire AFB, NJ, Flt
Orderly; Ringler, James J., (b) (6) AN, VR-6, 1611th ATW, ATLD, MATS, McGuire
AFB, NJ, Flt Orderly; Minsey, Robert J., (b) (6) ATC, VR-6, 1611th ATW, ATLD,
MATS, McGuire AFB, NJ, Flt Radio; Jokela, Roger A., (b) (6) AT3, VR-6, 1611th
ATW, ATLD, MATS, McGuire AFB, NJ, Flt Radio; Parachute: Unknown; Injury: Unknown.
G. 59.
H. Ryan, Robert W., (b) (6) Captain; Goodroe, Kenneth E., (b) (6) Captain;
Beard, Albert L., (b) (6) A/2C; Brookman, Dale R., (b) (6) A/2C; Bushler,
Conra, J., (b) (6) A/3C; Decote, Thomas T., (b) (6) S/Sgt; Deel, Roscoe
F., (b) (6) A/3C; Dewolf, Edmund R., (b) (6) A/2C; Disanto, John F.,
(b) (6) A/2C; Ferguson, Willie B., (b) (6) A/3C; Gaines, Alton J.,
(b) (6) A/1C; Gardener, Roland L., (b) (6) A/3C; Giancola, Cresr D.,
(b) (6) A/B; Grogan, Billy B., (b) (6) A/2C; Gruenberg, Eugene D.,
(b) (6) A/1C; Harding, Lloyd D., (b) (6) A/1C; Hepler, Cloyse A.,
(b) (6) A/2C; Hummel, Gerard J., (b) (6) A/3C; Hunter, Richard K.,
(b) (6) A/1C; Kana, Lee R., (b) (6) A/3C; King, Ronald L., (b) (6)
IAC; Lada, Robert, (b) (6) A/2C; Lipina, Robert H., (b) (6) A/3C;
Lock, Sherman W., (b) (6) A/3C; Loontiens, Joseph D., (b) (6) A/1C;
Luce, George F., (b) (6) A/2C; Macedonia, Michael C., (b) (6) A/1C;
Mountain, Ronald P., (b) (6) A/2C; Oscar, Stanley, (b) (6) A/2C;
Pagelli, Ralph M., (b) (6) A/2C; Peterson, Keith A., (b) (6) A/1C;
Rae, William R., (b) (6) A/2C; Reynolds, Donald L., (b) (6) A/3C;
Roman, Leonard J., (b) (6) A/2C; Schorr, James L., (b) (6) A/2C;
Schuver, Henry J., (b) (6) A/2C; Sillier, Abelar Jr., (b) (6) A/3C;
Spurling, Robert D., (b) (6) A/3C; Stewart, Bruce R., (b) (6) A/3C;
Tanner, Earl E., (b) (6) A/3C; Urban, Robert C., (b) (6) A/1C; Vasey,
Earl F., (b) (6) A/1C; Whitlock, James B., (b) (6) A/2C; Williamson,
Frank G. Jr., (b) (6) A/2C; Caibee, William, (b) (6) M/Sgt; Drake,
Raymond, (b) (6) A/2C; Banks, Herbert, (b) (6) A/2C; Giberson, Lyle C.,
(b) (6) A/2C; Godberg, Gene O., (b) (6) A/2C; Barnah, Charles W.,
(b) (6) A/2C; Parachute: Unknown; Injuries: Unknown.
I. Unknown.
J. N/A.
K. No known violation.
L. From Lakenheath England to Lajes Azores; IFR; 10/1826Z; 21,000 lbs; Unknown.

FROM: COMDR 1611TH AIRTRANSG MCGUIRE AFB NJ
TO: CHIEF OF STAFF USAF WASH DC
BUAER USAF WASHINGTON DC
OTIG USAF NORTON AFB CAL
COMDR USAFE WIESBADEN GERMANY
COMATS ANDREWS AFB WASH DC
IN SAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR
COMATLIDIVMATS MCGUIRE AFB NJ
COMDR MCGUIRE AFB NJ
NAVAL SAFETY CENTER NORFOLK VA
SURGEON GENERAL USAF WASH 25 DC
COMDR AMC WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OHIO
CCMDR 7AD SOUTH RUISLIP ENGLAND
CONDRA RDG BALTIMORE MD
COMDR WADC WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OHIO
COMDR VR6 MCGUIRE AFB NJ

UNCLAS WGFS 25-K-1

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT TO R6D #131588 AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT. O. 6105.0;
0; 6105.0; 1650.0. SPECIAL REQUIRED IAW PAR 49 & 52 AFR 62-14.

85

(b) (6)

Major, USAF

(b) (6)

WGFS

424

Adjutant

M. Unknown.
N. N/A.
O. Not Available at Lakenheath.
P. McGuire AFB, NJ.
Q. Unknown.
R. Unknown.
S. Unknown.
T. Unknown.
U. Unknown.

8
4

FROM: COMDR 1611TH AIRTRANSG MCGUIRE AFB NJ
TO: CHIEF OF STAFF USAF WASH DC
BUAER USAF WASHINGTON DC
OTIG USAF NORTON AFB CAL
COMDR USAFE WIESBADEN GERMANY
COMATS ANDREWS AFB WASH DC
IN SAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR
COMATLDIVMATS MCGUIRE AFB NJ
COMDR MCGUIRE AFB NJ
NAVAL SAFETY CENTER NORFOLK VA
SURGEON GENERAL USAF WASH 25 DC
COMDR AMC WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OHIO
COMDR 7AD SOUTH RUISLIP ENGLAND
CONDR ARDC BALTIMORE MD
COMDR WADC WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OHIO
COMDR VR6 MCGUIRE AFB NJ

UNCLAS WGFS 25-K-1

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT TO R6D #131588 AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT. O. 6105.0;
O; 6105.0; 1650.0. SPECIAL REQUIRED IAW PAR 49 & 52 AFR 62-14.

85

(b) (6)

Major, USAF

(b) (6)

WGFS

424

Adjutant

16 Oct 1956

REPORT ON R6D 1588

R6D 1588 trip 1190 departed Lakenheath 10/1826Z to Lajes ETA 11/0002Z alternate Santa Maria, altitude 16000 feet R/L flight plan with Point of Safe Return 4 plus 32.

Aircraft reported at 10N 08W 2012Z ETA 10N 10W 2036 ETA Lajes 0021Z. This information was received from Croughton at 2015Z PH/IN

The second report was 10N 10W at 2036Z, ETA 15W 2137Z, ETA Lajes 0031Z with 8 plus 00 fuel. Received from Croughton at 2058Z. PH/CS

10 October 1956

- 2200Z TCC South Ruislip called Croughton for information on latest position. CS
2250Z Croughton called back negative information on aircraft. DG/LG
2310Z Croughton called back: Advised they had called aircraft on all frequencies with no success they had also sent wire to Lajes, Sidi Slimane, Keflavik with none of the three having any information. DG/LG
2330Z TCC South Ruislip called OAC. They had no information, but they had sent wire to Santa Maria requesting information and said would call us back when they received an answer. HR/LG
2348Z TCC South Ruislip called Croughton, and had no information as yet, they had also sent wire to Santa Maria. FG/LG

11 October 1956

- 0035Z TCC South Ruislip called Lakenheath, still no information, they were still trying to contact Lajes. RB/LG
0045Z TCC South Ruislip sent EMERGENCY wire to Lajes requesting latest information. LG
0055Z Lakenheath called, advised us that rescue was notified. SA/LG
0057Z Received wire from Lajes Quote "UNCLAS LATCC 10-1109 REQ NEWS TRIP 1190 R6D 1588 DEP MAXL 10/1826Z ETA CSLA 11/0002Z NO CONTACT WITH AIRCRAFT AS YET AND CSAZ WILL NOT DECLARE ALERT" Unquote.
0103Z TCC South Ruislip called Flight Service for information, they had negative information but advised us that Prestwick OAC had declared an alert on aircraft at 0058Z. RR/LG
0105Z TCC South Ruislip sent Emergency wire to ATCC. LG
0120Z TCC South Ruislip called Lakenheath for latest information. Lakenheath advised they had called Rescue and Rescue said someone at Flight Service with the initials of SL gave them a position of 10N 1930W. Croughton checked this and found it to be a false position. RB/LG
0135Z TCC South Ruislip had a TELEX patch with Lajes Quote "From Lajes, We have negative information on R6D 1588, negative position reports, aircraft is over due one hour and thirty minutes this station. CSAZ just declared communications alert, our info states AJE declared alert, Uxbridge declared alert. Do you have any info on this aircraft." Unquote. We gave them latest position. "TCC Duty Officer do you have any CTC with Sidi Slimane and see if they at anytime had CTC with this aircraft." We told them of wire Croughton sent to Sidi Slimane. "Did you receive any position reports on this aircraft at all." we gave them positions again. "At any time did this aircraft say he had developed any trouble." We answered negative. "Will you advise Lajes TCC of latest information on this aircraft." We answered affirmative. "Will patch ATCC for information." We told them of Emergency wire sent to ATCC. We are going to call them anyhow". We sign off
0150Z TCC South Ruislip called Croughton again to see if they had received any information. They advised us they had, but said they had Lajes on 3 frequencies. SA/LG
0210Z TCC South Ruislip called Prestwick OAC. They still had negative information. Still in alert phase, emergency has not been declared as yet. HR/LG

REPORT ON R&D (cont') 16 Oct 56

Had TELEX patch with ATCC, patch went as follows:

- 0233Z MAYR Ruislip Here who do you want.
ENRI Duty Officer Please.
ENRI This is ATCC MATS MC GUIRE AFB NJ have a tape for your station
can we proceed please.
MAIR Go on will answer when duty officer comes if have to answer.
ENRI RGR
ENRI To AFMATS SOUTH RUISLIP ENGLAND
FROM ATCC ATLD MATS MC GUIRE AFB NJ
Request following information on R&D 1588, payload, number
of crew, actual gas load, FPGL, OPW, ATD CGRA. GJ please
MAYR Stand by for a couple minutes
ENRI RGR Also request departure station of R&D 1588 and also
name of person with whom we are talking
MAYR Ruislip R&D 1588 number of crew 0 AGL 21870 FPGL 17800
OPW 65953 departed MAJL, Controller is Capt (b) (6)
Correction on crew (9) payload unknown
ENRI RGR have that info finer, request latest known position
of aircraft and latest contact with aircraft and by whom
MAYR Latest known position 4810N 10W 2036Z EST 15W 2137Z EST
CSLA 0031Z, fuel 8 plus 00 relayed through Croughton Airways
ENRI Repeat Time of lastest contact with aircraft
MAYR RGR 2036Z
ENRI RGR do you know flight altitude
MAYR RGR 16000 PSR 4 plus 32
ENRI One minute please. Do you have any further information
pertinent to this flight, also how many passengers
MAYR Standby on one No of passengers 50, weight 12750
ENRI Do you have any other information other than what was sent
in the emergency wire we just had patch through AIROFNET
with Lajes, they have no additional information.
MAYR No further information on aircraft
ENRI RGR will sign off now, please contact ATCC immediately if
you receive any additional information
MAYR RGR understand, Ruislip out
ENRI RGR ATCC ATLD MATS MC GUIRE PORT DIX 339 out
0255Z 100 South Ruislip called Croughton, they said OAC declared distress
at 0255Z
0305Z Had another patch with ATCC. Patch as follows:
MAYR Ruislip here
MAYR Aircraft 1588 departed Lakenheath 10/1826Z
ENRI RGR do you have the aircraft commanders name
MAYR Lowe. 57th AMB Lajes have not sent out rescue aircraft
as yet they are requesting ramp check all air fields
in France, Germany, England, Italy, Spain and any other
place the aircraft might have diverted
ENRI RGR give me the aircraft commanders name
MAYR RGR repeat Lowe repeat
MAYR Prestwick OAC declared distress on aircraft 1588 at 110255Z
ENRI RGR still need aircraft commanders name
MAYR RGR Lowe repeat Lowe
ENRI RGR understand did any ARS get airborne from any location
to your knowledge
MAYR Not to our Knowledge
ENRI RGR keep us posted on anything you may get via this
facility. Nothing further here
MAYR RGR will do
MAYR Ruislip out
ENRI ATCC out
0312Z TCC Ruislip called Rescue to see what action they had taken
toward INX from Lajes. They are checking France, Germany and
Spain before dispatching aircraft. HO/LG

28

REPORT ON R&D (cont'd) 16 Oct 56

- 0317Z TCC Ruislip called Croughton again to see what action was taken. Croughton called Paris and Paris is checking France, Germany and Spain.
- 0320Z TCC Ruislip called OAC to see what action they had taken. OAC has tried TFRK, CYTR, CSAZ, NEW YORK, LISBON, EAMC, FNOL UK AREA, WY SHIP JULIET with no information from any. RR/LG
- 0325Z Flight Service called TCC and said OAC said a Bolling civilian aircraft OCL said 1588 was working CYJT on 67 KS. Croughton is trying to get this confirmed. RR/LG
- 0335Z Croughton called TCC gave this position 4132N 6542W at 0300Z. Prestwick OAC would not accept this position and distress is still on. SA/LG
- 0400Z TCC Ruislip called OAC. They still have negative information. Paris advised no airfield in France has an information on aircraft. RH/LG
- 0406Z TCC Ruislip called Rescue. Rescue is dispatching aircraft from Prestwick. C-54 72524 will start search at MDXC to 4810N 10W. This will be a creeping search at 4810N 10W. They will go into an expanding circle. HO/LG
- 0420Z Croughton called TCC. Aircraft had negative contact with CYJT. SA/LG
- 0500Z Had another patch with Lajes. Patch as follows.
CSLA: Message received from ocean station Kilo at 0349Z. Picked up SOS from 1588 on 500KCS. Kilo position 4710N 0826W. Can you give this information to all concerned agencies.
- 0515Z Had another patch with ATCC.
EWRI This is ATCC MATS McGuire AFB NJ, Standby please
 1. Time of first indication that aircraft was out of contact
 2. TCC Ruislip summarized actions and action thereafter
 3. Action taken by Croughton and times thereof
 4. Was there action taken prior to formal declaration of alert at 0058Z if so, what was it
 5. Was alert requested by TCC So Ruislip or by Croughton. Purpose of above Question is to determine what action was taken between 2137Z estimated position report and 0058Z time of alert
 6. What weather was including enroute and destination and alternate given to the pilot by Lakenheath
 7. Have reports been received from all air ground stations and ocean vessels
 8. Has CINCINNATI been informed for possible surface search assistance
- MAYR Gave EWRI all that had been done by TCC so Ruislip (See above report).
- EWRI Request name of Senior Controller on duty at TCC So Ruislip and Lakenheath and did Lakenheath MATS controller give first MATS clearance.
- MAYR The Senior Controller on duty at TCC So Ruislip is Capt Allen. Standby for other information.
- EWRI Can you have Croughton find out from Kilo if the position that they received was from the aircraft in the air or from a raft and further if possible if possible if position was determined by Kilo from a fixed position and if so did any other station cross fix the position.
- MAYR We have already asked Croughton to contact Kilo to get position confirmed.
- EWRI Call us back when you have information and also name of Lakenheath controller
- MAYR Standby one please someone is on the phone now. False will call you back
- EWRI Are you signing off.
- MAYR Did you receive my message in full from item 12 through item 26.

88

REPORT ON R&D (cont') 16 Oct 56

EMRI ROR and do you want me to standby for further information or will you call back as I stated.
MAYR Will call you back.
EMRI ROR ATCC out.
MAYR Ruislip out
0520Z Croughton call TCC. Kilo will try to track same course as aircraft. SA/LG
0603Z Croughton called TCC.. Two Rescue planes from Santa Maria departed. 72590 at 0427Z and 72615 at 0540Z. SA. LG
0605Z TCC So Ruislip called Wing Duty Officer
0607Z TCC So Ruislip called Col Forest
0610Z TCC So Ruislip Notified Col Henley
0611Z TCC So Ruislip Notified Wing Base TCC
0615Z Croughton called TCC. 57th Air Rescue sent out 2 C-54 aircraft both to fly proposed route of aircraft and contact Kilo in search pattern of last position.
0629Z TCC So Ruislip notified Maj Catlin.
0640Z Had another patch with ATCC. Patch as follows:
EMRI Request if Croughton has been able to connect ocean station Kilo and if bearing of station to 500KC distress signal has been determined. Interpretation here is that position given is the position of the ocean station and not that of the aircraft.
MAYR Only information so far is Croughton called ocean station Kilo and they will try to track same course as aircraft.
MAYR Position given previously is position of ocean station Kilo not aircraft.
MAYR Capt [redacted] (b) (6) is Senior Controller at Lakenheath and signed clearance.
EMRI Request you persu information desired above with Croughton and call back results.
MAYR Will do.
EMRI Do you have the bearing that the ocean station has or had on the aircraft.
MAYR Negative will try to get it from Croughton.
EMRI ROR call back out
MAYR Ruislip out
0650Z Had another patch with Lajes. Patch as follows:
CSLA Do you have any information on this at present. Can you contact LYK, that is ocean station Kilo and give instrument track on distress signal, we are attempting to establish contact with LYK now but have not succeeded so far. Our Air Rescue aircraft has been dispatched. Has any Air Rescue been dispatched from UK.
They are checking with other stations right now.
Do you have any further information.
That is all for now, if any further developments, please notify us and we will do the same.
0650Z Another patch with ATLD. Patch as follows:
EMRI Request you query all surface shipping agencies as to position of ships in vicinity of last known position aircraft 1588, that is known position of aircraft.
EMRI Can you ascertain, request you ascertain if any other vessel in the area has received an SOS repeat SOS or any transmissions from aircraft other than ocean station Kilo. Also inquire local shipping offices and ARS. Did you get this please.
MAYR Information regarding determination of bearing from Kilo unable to be gotten by Croughton or Lajes. Due not in contact with Kilo.
EMRI Please clarify MAXX.
MAYR MAXX is Croughton Airways Station.

68

REPORT ON R&D (cont') 16 Oct 56

MAIR Following answer to your last query. Weather ship Kilo is starting course line search from last known position. All surface vessels and aircraft notified of alert. Rescue aircraft airborne. Tanker from 7AD starting out at sunrise. More aircraft from Iceland enroute to search. Rescue aircraft will depart Manston as soon as fog permits. Rescue aircraft departing Prestwick. Sidi Slimane is also sending an aircraft to the area. Go ahead

EWRI ROR acknowledge your message

MAIR Out

EWRI Hold on please. Are you still there please.

MAIR ROR go ahead

EWRI Is that rpt two 2 part at beginning of your message

MAIR That is two

MAIR Also it should read nine tankers

MAIR ROR and do you have any information from previous querys from other shipping agencies.

MAIR Negative on answer from shipping agencies. RAF is working this.

EWRI ROR and please advise when any of the search aircraft are in the area and if any of these aircraft are capable of contacting Kilo for further information.

MAIR ROR will do

0630Z Rescue called weather station Kilo starting course line search. RAF has all aircraft and surface vessels. Sidi Slimane sending 1 aircraft, 9 tankers going out, 2 coming from Iceland and 2 more from Prestwick. HO/BC

0647Z Croughton called TCC, advises 7 KU-97 from MAII being sent out on search ASAP. Base fogged in. RR/TP

0653Z Flight Service called TCC, told him about SOS from KILO. RR/LG
0655Z Called Rescue, 7254 over Landsend 0631Z, 72590 airborne out of Lajes on course survey. 17160 SA-16 out of Sidi Slimane, 17218 SA-16 out of Paris departed 0632Z enroute to ocean.

RAF has 2 Shackletons at MDXG to depart as soon as fog lifts.

0710Z Wing called TCC, gave him departure plan and load message. RL/LG
0710Z TCC So Ruislip called Prestwick. 57th Air Rescue dispatching C-54 2524 at 0426Z and 2456 is airborne 0836Z, Keflavik has 2 C-54 out on search.

0735Z TCC So Ruislip called Rescue. The SOS was not from aircraft but from ship regarding 1588. HO/BC

0740Z TCC So Ruislip called Rescue. 3299 was at 52N 2230W on 500KC received a definite SOS in code bearing was 100 degrees MG from 52. He received at 0702Z

0758Z Another patch with ATCC. Patch as follows

0810Z Called Lakenheath. Request SAC load number. The load number is M 37. MS/LG

0815Z TCC So Ruislip called Rescue to get aircraft information on 2 C-54 from Keflavik, 1 from Paris, 1 from Sidi Slimane and 2 from Manston. 2 C-54 over Landsend 0624Z
No later information.

0830Z Called Lakenheath and requested they transmit manifest to ATCC. MS/TP
0835Z Major (b) (6) briefed the Deputy Commander, 3 AF, on status.

0840Z C. T. of DEWB called and requested information on passengers, crew and aircraft and whether or not crew had been briefed on new position of ocean station Kilo. Following information given by Capt (b) (6) 50 passengers, crew 9, R&D Navy, unknown if crew had been briefed on new position of Kilo, TCC South Ruislip received operational latitudes that night of ocean station Kilo.

0905Z Major (b) (6) briefed Colonel Peterson 3AF on status.

0910Z TCC So Ruislip called Rescue. Requested they add us on all air Rescue Aircraft movement. Capt (b) (6) BC

REPORT ON R&D (cont'd) 16 Oct 56

0930Z Major (b) (6) called Captain (b) (6) on status of ARS operations and received complete rundown of aircraft in search area. (See ARS Log)

0940Z Airman (b) (6) ARS, called for Major (b) (6)

0955Z Sgt (b) (6) called Major (b) (6) ATLD is on TELEX and wants to know the status on the manifest and if USAF was included as an addressee. (b) (6) is getting status from Lakenheath and will reply to ATLD.

1000Z Received message from ATLD on C-118 3299, receipt of SOS. (See Telex message) (number 10).

1005Z Colonel Forest called Colonel Ward with complete maintenance status from Lakenheath. (see report for status)

1010Z Called Lakenheath for maintenance status of aircraft. (see log)

1015Z Called Wiesbaden ARS for information on aircraft going out to search area. (see log for details)

1015Z Call from Captain Melville, USN, offering services of USN (Rescue also notified) if they can be of help. Only vessel in the area is Opelthorpe from Gibraltar to ZI and it has been advised. BSC C-118 3299 will certify SOS call when he lands at Orly. Message came from Croughton. GB/BS

1020Z Colonel Henley called General Wetzel by telephone and gave him a complete rundown.

1025Z Major (b) (6) called in and said the manifest will be transmitted at 1030Z. Sgt (b) (6) advised ATLD via TELEX.

1035Z Capt (b) (6) called Maj (b) (6) and said he had instructed NBC TV to send Mr. Peters to Manston to board SA-16 at 1445Z coming in from Sidi Slimane. Capt (b) (6) from FIO, Manston, to follow up. Advised Col Forest 1040Z.

1040Z Called Weather for latest in search area. No other surface reports from search area

1042Z Last report at 2100Z - clear 10-080/20

1042Z 7 KC-97 outbound from St Eval at 1005Z.

1042Z 3299 (Hot Dog) stated that it was never in contact with Juliet, distress message received was from Spanish surface vessel, call sign KIK.

1050Z Major (b) (6) from Rhein Main called Maj (b) (6) to see if he could give us any help.

1050Z Captain from 3 AF called Col Forest to say Birdlip Park is sending medical team to Shaftsbury and they may need air-evac aircraft. Col Forest requested Surgeon contact Col Payne 3 AF Operations.

1055Z Capt (b) (6) requested number of officers and airmen crew members on aircraft. Attempting to get information from Lakenheath.

1100Z Maj (b) (6) gave General Wilson complete rundown. Gen Wilson has to leave for the Columbia Club and wants us to advise him if we get anything definite.

1100Z Received TELEX call from ATLD. (See TELEX message number 11)

1105Z Capt Melvin USN, London called wanting to know if any Navy personnel were on the passenger manifest. Maj (b) (6) will return call.

1115Z Capt (b) (6) requested a picture of an R&D.

1120Z Colonel Henley called Greenham Common. See Note

1120Z Lt (b) (6) received status on ARS aircraft. (See ARS log.)

1125Z Maj (b) (6) called Col Forest to give him data on "175". (See log for info). Col Forest has information for Col Henley to be passed to Gen Wetzel from Maj (b) (6) (see note)

1130Z Col Chadwell 7th AD COFS requested we hand carry copy of crew list to his office. We will forward as soon as possible.

1130Z Briefed the Commander, AACB on status. Said he would send two KB-29's in search. Advise him to contact Bushy 500 for operation action on KB-29's.

- 1140Z Major (b) (6) passed status of crew and passengers to Capt Melvin, USN, London.
- 1145Z Sgt (b) (6) called Capt (b) (6) and passed information on crew (3 Off, 6 amn), which he had requested. Capt (b) (6) stated that PIO was 3 AF and 7 AD "Joint Press Room".
- 1145Z Col Bledsoe, Wing Material, called and wanted to know the maintenance status on 1588. Col Forest gave him the same information he gave to Col Ward about one hour earlier.
- 1145Z Capt (b) (6) called Maj (b) (6) and was given data on arrival and departure from McGuire, until departure from Lakenheath.
- 1145Z Major (b) (6) sending "175" data to ATLD via TELEX.
- 1150Z Major (b) (6) called Col Forest and passed additional information on crew weather briefing.
- 1155Z Capt (b) (6) called Orly for aircraft commander on 3299, however, aircraft taxing in to line.
- 1200Z Capt (b) (6) 7 AD PIO called Col Forest and stated "Quote United Press will have a cameraman on second SA-16 from Manston this afternoon. RAF Shackleton has cameraman aboard who will distribute pictures to all papers as soon as possible.
- 1210Z Crypto called and said they had an Operational Immediate classified. Maj (b) (6) picked it up.
- 1210Z Received a call from Lt (b) (6) in regards to any news. He is from Birdrop Park Hospital which is furnishing medical facilities. (Sgt (b) (6))
- 1220Z Maj (b) (6) 3 AF Comd request flight plan data and furnished by Lt (b) (6)
- 1225Z Called Capt (b) (6) about passenger load list and the status of Air Rescue. Passed for PIO purposes. (Maj (b) (6))
- 1230Z Capt (b) (6) had a conversation with aircraft commander on 3299 (Hot Dog). The following statement was made: About 3 hours out of Harmon 3299 received the information that 31588 was missing. All frequencies were monitored continuously thereafter. At 0715 first SOS on 500KC, definite SOS received three times. Message that followed wasn't fast to be copied. It was hand transmitted. (The Aircraft Commander of 3299 is a former rescue commander and is familiar with this operation). One of the passengers on the aircraft was able to copy at a high rate and at 0815Z another SOS was received. The message was SOS EJK SOS three times. The transmission then proceeded to give the following information. USAF aircraft 31588 overdue and believed down. It gave the number of passengers and crew; ETD to Lajes; USAF aircraft are searching. In the opinion of the Aircraft Commander of 3299 it was some radio transmitting this distress situation over the 500KC distress frequency. The Aircraft Commander of 3299 did not talk with the ocean station Kilo. Both the Aircraft Commander and the Squadron Chief Pilot were in the cockpit and both will verify the above facts.
- 1235Z Capt (b) (6) called and wanted information as to how long a life preserver would keep a man afloat. (Sgt (b) (6))
- 1240Z TELEX call from ATLD. Maj (b) (6) passed weather data from form 175 and SOS report from trip Al23. (see TELEX message number 12)
- 1330Z TELEX call from ATLD. Reference passenger manifest and weather. (see TELEX msg)
- 1330Z Classified patch started to ATCC by Maj (b) (6)
- 1335Z Called Bushy Park ARS Operations and they had no new information. (Lt Caleb)
- 1345Z Groughton advised of sighting a possible oil slick and a red barrel at 46.40N 15.10W 46.40N 14.40W 46.20N 14.40W RH/DC
- 1400Z Checked with Lakenheath and they had no knowledge of a red can on board 1588.
- 1410Z General Wissand, 3 AF, advised on oil slick.
- 1415Z Capt (b) (6) advised they had no later information, coordinates are 46.20N 15.10W, 46.40N 15.00W, 46.40N 14.40W, 46.20N 14.40W,

REPORT ON R6D (cont') 16 Oct 56

weather 2500 scattered to broken, visibility 15-18, winds 22-29 060/ 11h5 Capt (b) /HXC
1505Z Maj (b) (6) called Bushy Park 500 in reference to rumor of pickup of 14 passengers.
1510Z PIO 7AD called and advised they will be open to 1200Z 11 Oct and wanted to be kept advised of any events.
1515Z Colonel Ward called Maj (b) (6) and was given complete status.
1555Z Called Bushy Part Rescue Operations. No news. 27 aircraft in search area plus 6 MATS scheduled trips flying low level and searching. CB/PC.
1717Z Capt (b) (6) PIO, called and desired information on how many aircraft actively participating in search.
1803Z Colonel Forest called and was given latest information.
1810Z Capt (b) (6) Rescue Operations, Bushy Park, called and gave latest rundown on search aircraft (Capt Kayea)
1915Z Gave Capt (b) (6) information on fuel aboard 1588. Computed from Mammal. Capt (b) (6) advised that 6 aircraft were in search area.
1915Z Capt (b) (6) to Capt (b) (6), ARS sending required reports IAW AFR 52-B.
1920Z Capt (b) (6) requested information on aircraft that are airborne.
1955Z Croughton called trying to locate the initials of the station that sent SOS. Gave them the initials and requested they advise us when they found out the name of the station.
2025Z Checked with Lakenheath to see if the base had sent out a wire required by AFR 62-11 Capt (b) (6) will check and advise. BSC
2030Z 9th RCC received a message from Ham Operator in Colorado, coinciding approximately with fuel exhaustion at 10/2235 Mountain Time. Instigating emergency procedures, going on emergency fuel and turning around - also heard words ATC and numbers - some garbled 1 and 8. Received on 20M Band.
2035Z Capt (b) (6) advised that 7AD interpreted regulations to required Lajes to send message to Eq, USAF.
2050Z Message sent to Lajes advising them of this.
2200Z Captain (b) USN advised Navy participation will be Task Force composed of carrier Randolph, 5 Destroyers, and auxiliary vessels. Task Force is 1200 miles from search area and they expect to be in aircraft search range by sunrise. Navy also ordering 6 patrol bombers from Keflavik to England, also 6 from Malta to Lajes. MSTS Blue Jacket will be in area shortly.
2230Z Checked with Rescue - No change. Weather from surface vessel at 2100Z 46.8N 13.6W, 1600 feet overcast, 5 miles visibility, 060/26, 9¹/₂foot waves 8 seconds apart moving 110 degrees.
2315Z Message from ATCC 10-649 instructing aircraft to relay distress calls to Lajes and South Ruislip.

12 October 1956

0005Z Maj (b) (6) called Capt (b) (6) - advised him that the Chief Navigator here has plotted the maximum range of R6D and assuming he had inverter trouble which would indicate no means of navigation and Ham operator data indicates aircraft down south of Lajes. ARS asked that we advise them where we thought the aircraft was.
0025Z Computed most probable position if aircraft had inverter trouble and ran out ETA. Supposition: Normally aircraft would run 30 minutes past ETA. Possibility that aircraft ran 1 hour past ETA Lajes. Then he would return down track not deviating by more than 60 miles left or right of course. He would continue this until out of fuel. In addition wind condition is such that he could have been a maximum of 6° left or right of course from last known position until emergency. Adding these factors the most probable ditching area would be: 36.2ON 30.45W, 37.3ON 29.0OW 34.45N 29.2OW, 36.0ON 27.4OW Secondary area would be: 37.45N 32.1OW, 38.45N 30.1OW, 34.45N 29.2OW, 36.0ON 27.4OW, Expanded

REPORT ON R6D (cont'd) 16 Oct 56

area would be: 36°45N 34.15W, 33°30N 31.00W, 36°45N 30.10W,
(b) (6) 36°00N 27.40W. This data passed by Major (b) (6) and Major
(b) (6) to Capt (b) (6) ARS who stated he would pass on to
Search Commander.

- 0105Z Prepared text of theory on aircraft down southeast of Lajes and am passing to Lajes via TELEX for concurrence. (JJB)
0125Z TELEX tape cut and ready to roll. (JJB)
0136Z TELEX message and discussion with ATLD. They clarified Colorado pick-up and are now checking our findings with McGuire Flight Planning's study of same facts. (JJB)
0212Z Received message from Lajes requesting clarification of our message on AFM 60-14.
0212Z Bushy Park 500 busy. 3 calls. (JJB)
0214Z Called Bushy Park 500 and passed additional data from ATLD TELEX message on background of Colorado Ham Operator who received radio transmission. Capt (b) (6) said he doesn't know why they are making such a fuss over this data. They have a search area to search and that's what they are doing. Advised him we were passing on any data we might receive for their interpretation. (JJB)
0249Z Aircraft 7768, 7761, 1623, 0227, 900, 5830 at 10W. 0347Z two more aircraft will go to search area. 3 aircraft will leave Keflavik at 0630Z.
0310Z Communication Center in London probably Navy requested how to route a message to St Mawgan. Advised him where St Mawgan was and probable routing was RAF Coastal Command. (Smith)
0322Z Ocean station advised it was starting search in zone where barrel and oil patch have been sighted by aircraft. Present position of Kilo is 12/0130Z 46.31N 14.41W.
0325Z From KLM, PAA 71, 0251Z Position 50.26N 26.55W picked up SOS on 500KC true bearing 186 degrees. Correct time 0215Z. (Capt Ohlrich)
0327Z Passed 0325Z message to 9th ARCC.
0337Z Croughton called and passed the same message as KLM. (Smith)
0342Z Sent same message to ATLD (Emergency) on KLM call.

"A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY"

(b) (6)

Major USAF
Accident Investigating Officer

94

HEADQUARTERS
AZORES AIR TRANSPORT STATION
ATLANTIC DIVISION, MATS
APO 406, NEW YORK, N. Y.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS R6D 1588

1. 091826Z Departed Lakenheath ETA 43N 10/2234Z ETA Lajes 11/0002Z
Corrected to 11/0031Z
2. 10/2250Z TCC called Lajes Airways requesting position report for 43N.
Awys advised no contact had been made and further advised they would
contact Santa Maria. Santa Maria had no info.
3. Approximately every 10 min. TCC contacted Lajes Awys and requested
further info on this acft.
4. 10/2335Z TCC declared Flt Progress alert and requested Santa Maria
declare official communications alert. Santa Maria refused to declare
alert until Prestwick OAC did. ARS informed of incident.
5. 10/2400Z TCC Duty Officer notified OIC and advised of incident. Col.
Belville and Col. Rapisardi advised by OIC TCC.
6. 11/0031Z emergency request news dispatched to London Flt Service and
South Ruislip.
7. 11/0115Z simultaneous telepatches made with ATCC, South Ruislip and
Sidi Slimane querying them on any info on 1588, and requesting noti-
fication of appropriate agencies. (Continuous contact South and Sidi
from here on.)
8. 11/0117Z received msg from London Flt Serv giving neg info but
advising official communication alert declared 11/0058Z.
9. 11/0119Z Santa Maria declared alert.
10. 11/0120Z Lajes Awys requested to query all acft for possible info.
11. 11/0150Z Santa Maria confirmed departure flt plan and gave last known
position of 4810N 1000W at 2055Z
12. TCC dispatched msg to ATCC advising negative position reports, no
further info from any agencies except official alert declared at 0058Z
time of dispatch 11/0215Z.
13. 11/0230Z C-54 5578 enroute St. Eval - Lajes contacted for any info on
1588. No info. 5578 attempted contact with 1588 on all freq neg info.
14. 11/0250Z Casa Blanca & Paris Flt Serv adv info Basops
15. 11/0323Z msg dispatched to ATCC advising Prestwick OAC has declared
1588 in distress at 0312Z.
16. Air Rescue will provide info regarding actual search.
17. Beginning at 0715Z six C-54's and one 124 were dispatched at 2000'
and 3000' on Rhumbline to St. Eval to aid in search.
18. ARS dispatched first SC-54 at 0427Z we received info from South
that Prestwick Harmon and also dispatched a/c.
19. 2nd SC-54 Lajes 0544Z.

95

20. 6 C-54's and 1 C124 dispatched 0745Z-0915Z.
21. 1 B-17 Portugal dispatched 1105Z.
22. 2 P2V's dispatched 1654 and 1709Z.
23. 1 SC-54 Harmon dispatched 1702Z.

Note: From par 7 on Lajes was in constant communications with ATCC, South Ruislip and Sidi Slimane via telepatch.

"A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY"

(b) (6)



Major, USAF
Accident Investigating Officer

96

OUTGOING MESSAGES RELATIVE R&D 31588

From TCC South Ruislip to ATCC McGuire AFB NJ
Y 110104Z
UNCLAS 1602-5T-11-K-03 PD THIS TCC ADVISES AND
ALERT WAS DECLARED ON R&D 1588AT 110058Z BY PRESTWICK
OAC PD THIS TCC SENT EMERGENCY WIRE TO CSLA WITH
NO ANSWER AS YET PD ACFT WAS EST CSLA 110002Z PD

From TCC South Ruislip to TCO Lajes Field Azores
Y 110045Z
UNCLAS 1602-5T-11-K-01 PD REQ ARK OF R&D 1588 OR
ANY INFOR ON THIS ACFT PD LATEST INFOR THIS TCC
ACFT EST 13N 2244Z AND CSLA 0031Z PD END

" A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY"

(b) (6)

Major USAF
Accident Investigating Officer

97

FROM: COMDR 1611 AIRTRANSWG MCGUIRE AFB NJ
TO: COMDR 9TH AIR RESCUE GROUP BUSHY PARK, ENGLAND
INFO: COMDR ARS ORLANDO AFB FLORIDA
COMDR SAC OFFUTT AFB NEBRASKA
COMDR 3AF SOUTH RUISLIP ENGLAND
COMATS ANDREWS AFB WASHINGTON DC
COMATLDIVMATS MCGUIRE AFB NJ (MSGR)

WGFS 033-K
SANDPAPER. Wheels and life raft have been positively
identified as part of Romeo six Delta one five eight eight.
Request this headquarters be advised of any additional
parts that are recovered.

98

s/t/ (b) (6) Major, USAF s/t/ (b) (6) Major, USAF
WGFS 424 Adjutant

MAAA

6/MAXL

MAXL AF 03 10/1026Z

FF MAAA HDAA GGAA-EINN OAC CSAZ OAC CSLA CSAZ
AIRMOVE UNCLASS DEPARTURE PLN

A MATS 31500 B R6D C MAXOEEEE C MAXL DA.

IFR 16000 DIR DAVENTSEE DAVENTRY DIR BRISTOL DIR 3110N 0030W
1+06 DIR ST MAWGAN 1+41 DIR 4900N 008W 2+05 DIR 40N 10W 3+05
DIR 4530N 10W 4+06 DIR 43N 1930W 5+05 DIR 3900N 20W 5+05
DIR LAJES

E CSLA F DEPT. 10/1026Z G 225 KTS H 5 HRS PLUS 00 MIN

I CSAZ J RUT K NIL L LOWE PLUS 8

M 11 HRS PLUS 00 MIN N SPECIAL B DASH 7

RMKS: SOB 59 TRIP NO 1190

ASFC

TOD 1903Z DCS

NFT NFT

RGR AS AT 1905Z MALE

99

16 Oct 1996

INCOMING MESSAGES RELATIVE TO R6D 31588

From SRCC Lakenheath to South Ruislip, TOR 10/2014Z Oct

O 101925Z

BT

UNCLAS/BAC SUPPORT SRCC=60-56-1091 PD MATS DEP PLT PLN 1190 LOWE
PLUB 8 R6D/1588 R/L MAXL 10/1826 CSAZ 11/0002Z CSAZ 1700/21070
BT MAWAN 10/19321 160/235 OPW 10/17076 PART II
160/PLUB 24/1800M/1000M/235

/1 PLUB 25/1630H/1500M

/2 PLUB 37/1300H/2000M

/3 PLUB 44/1950H/2500M

PART III TAB 1 PLUB 32 VIP CODE NEO REMARKS ETA 1400H 1930W 10/2231Z
OPW 65053 NEO NMN NAV

BT

10/1930 OCT RJDLOA

From SRCC Lakenheath to South Ruislip, TOR 10/2014Z

O 101925Z

BT

____/BAC SUPPORT SRCC=60-56-1090 PD 1190 LOWE PLUB 8 MAXL
10/1805/1802Z CSAZ 11/0021Z CSAZ OPW 65053 1700/21070 ACT 11406
KLHK FAX 50/12750 GAOOO NEO DELAY NEO REMARKS NEO

BT

10/1930Z OCT RJDLOA

From Prestwick OAC to South Ruislip, TOR 11/0009Z
RFB

CBY...ARE YOU PUTTING ALERT ON 31588?

OAC OGAA

ASY R FROM OAC CSAZ, NO. 31588 DID NOT ENTER OAC AREA
BT CSAZ AREA 2231. HAD LAST QBO 2055.
MVB R

QCL 0052.NA.

From Lajes Field Agores to South Ruislip, TOR 11/0007Z

T 110031Z

BT

____/ LATCO 10-1109 PD REQ NMW TRIP 1190 R6D 1588 OMA DEP MAXL
10/1826Z ETA CSAZ 11/0002Z PD NO CONTACT WITH AIRCRAFT AS YET AND
CSAZ WILL NOT DECLARER ALERT

BT

11/0040Z OCT UOFTYO

From Santa Maria ACC to South Ruislip, TOR 0100Z
DE MAAA

CSAZ 5 110050Z

MAAA Z1 MAYR

DD OAC OGAA EINN TCG MAYR

RHQ NMW NAVY 31588 DEP MAXL TO CSAZ ETA CSAZ 0021 PD

NEWT QTH AND NEWS IN CSAZ AREA PD

ACC CSAZ 0018Z

AB

T O D 0110Z J W

BNATR 10 11 0110 08

From 57th ARS Lajes Field to 9th ARCC Bushy Park, Info to South Ruislip
T 110237Z

BT

HAVE NOT SENT OUT RESCUE AIRCRAFT AS YET HQM YOU RAMP CHECK ALL
AIRFIELDS IN FRANCE-GERMANY-ENGLAND-ITALY-SPAIN-AND ANY OTHER PLACE
THE AIRCRAFT MIGHT HAVE DIVERTED TO

BT

11/0239Z OCT UOFTAW

6 10 10 1 54

INCOMING MESSAGES RELATIVE TO R6D 31588 (cont') 16 Oct 56

From Santa Maria ACC to South Ruislip, TOR 11/0247Z

MAYR

MAAA Z/3 TCC MAYR

CSAZ 15 110231Z

SVH TCC MAYR

REQUEST URGENT NEWS RPT URGENT NEWS ON NAVY 31588 DEP MAXL AT
1826Z TO CSLA FD

LAST CONTACT WITH GALA POSN 4810N LOW AT 2036Z EST CSLA 0031Z
FD ALERT DECLARED AT 110158Z

BY EIP

AAC CSAZ 110229Z

AS


MAYR 11/0247Z HYAMS PSE QSL IMMAR


"A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY"


(b) (6)


Major USAF
Accident Investigating Officer

101














1009

















SA SYMBOLS		22.		LAJES				10. VALID FOR DEPARTURE BETWEEN 10/1100 GCT AND 10/1600 GCT		11. VALID FOR ARRIVAL BETWEEN 10/2130 GCT AND 11/0000 GCT		12. VIA ST. MANGAN		13. TRACK						
								TERMINAL AND ALTERNATE FORECASTS												
RAIN		STATION NAME		TIME OF PREPARATION GCT		PERIOD OF VALIDITY GCT		TIME OF LATEST SYN-OPTIC CHART		SURFACE WIND DIRECTION, VELOCITY AND GUSTINESS		SURFACE VISIBILITY		WEATHER AND OBSTRUCTION TO VISION		CLOUD AMOUNT, TYPE, HEIGHT OF BASES AND TOPS			ALTIMETER SETTING S (IN)	
SNOW		LAJES		10/1000		10/1600		10/1600		C/10/10420 10:		RW		6/8 Sc 2000 4/8 Sc 2500		6/8 Sc 2000 4/8 Sc 2500			12000	
FOG		SANTA MARIA		↓		↓		↓		010/15		15		RW		4/8 Cu 1800 3/8 Cu 2500			3000	
HAIL																				
THUNDERSTORM																				
BLOWING SAND OR DUST																				
BLOWING (DRIFTING) SNOW																				
ICE PELLETS (SLEET)																				
FREEZING RAIN																				
RAIN AND SNOW (MIXED)																				
SQUALL																				
LITE RIME ICING																				
MOD RIME ICING																				
SEV RIME ICING																				
LITE CLEAR ICING																				
MOD CLEAR ICING																				
SEV CLEAR ICING																				
LITE TURBULENCE																				
MOD TURBULENCE																				
SEV TURBULENCE																				
SOLID LINES																				
GREEN - 0°C ISOTHERM																				
BLUE - COLD FRONT																				
RED - WARM FRONT																				
PURPLE - OCCLUDED FRONT																				
AND - STATIONARY FRONT																				
BLUE - FRONT																				
16. IDENTIFICATION POINT		LAKENHEATH		ST. MANGAN		10°W		15°W		15°W		20°W		20°W						
17. SIGNIFICANT WEATHER																				
18. BASE OF LOW CLOUDS		3000'																		
19. VISIBILITY		1M																		
20. REMARKS																				
21. SURFACE																				
WINDS AND TEMPERATURES				FT MSL																
				FT MSL																
				FT MSL																

P-75

FIGURE P-214

65

STANDARD FLIGHT PLAN

70 Oct 51

— 金区图书馆 —

78

AIRCRAFT OWNER

~~REVIEW~~ ~~BY~~ ~~JOHN~~

1588

AIRCRAFT
R.D. Jaws (b)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

1

PRINTED IN U.S.A. BY THOMAS COOK

FLIGHT PLANNING DATA

DATE TIME 10 OCT TO LAGES

AIRPORT TYPE R6P VIA

ACFT ID 1588

AIR IDENTIFIER ETD 1400Z

WINDS REQUESTED BY +200 1100 Z

PILOT

ZONE	ALT	TIME	WIND DIR/VEL
1 040/14	16000'	-11	/
2 160/20			/
3 C 30/25			/
4 740/15			/
5 720/20			/
6 010/20		-11	/
7			/
8			/
9			/
10			/
11			/
12			/
13			/
14			/
15			/
16			/

ALTERNATES ALT TIME WIND WEATHER
DIR/VEL GND/VIS

1				
2				
3				

PLANE TO CROSS EQUATOR ✓
ESTIMATED TIME OF CROSSING
TIME OF DAY / 0000L / 0000Z -

10/39

NAVAL AIR TRANSPORT SQUADRON SIX
McGuire Air Force Base
Trenton, New Jersey

8 October 1956

From: Commanding Officer
To: LCDR F. B. LOEB, (b) (6), USN

Subj: Operating Orders

Ref: (a) ATLD Operations Bulletin of October 1956
(b) ATLS Manual 55-2
(c) 1611th AF Op Order No. 60-55

1. Upon receipt of these orders and when directed, you will assume command of the aircraft listed below and such NCO/CICLIC directive(s) may be assigned. On or about 8 October 1956, you will proceed on such recalled trips as may be assigned by proper authority in compliance with reference (a).

2. In accordance with reference (b), a designated Aircraft Commander will personally pilot the aircraft from the left pilot seat on each take-off and landing.

3. Numbers of your crew and assigned Obligation Task Numbers are:

NAME	PILOT NUMBER	OBLIGATION	TASK NO
*LCDR F. B. LOEB	1315	Aircraft Commander (PTB)	T-1501
*LCDR W. A. WILLIAMS	1310	Aircraft Commander	T-1500
*ENS D. G. SCHREIBER	1310	First Pilot	T-1501
*ENRM. F. ... D2	(b) (6)	Flight Engineer	T-1502
*STOKE, H. H. ADL		Flight Engineer (Trainee)	T-1503
*CLOTHIER, F. T. T2		Flight Radio	T-1504
*MC CLASSING, R. W. AN		Flight Orderly	T-1505
*WINGLER, J. J. J. AN		Flight Orderly	T-1506

Hiney R.J. ATC

Jokela RA ATC

(b) (6)

Fit Radio T1520

... ... T1512

*Unauthorized access to SECRET MATERIAL necessary for mission accomplishment.

4. Charitable Appropriation 1771502.33, AFM'57, allotment 88606, Expenditure account 39999. No orders prepared in accordance with paragraph 5150, Part D, Chapter 5, Joint Travel Regulations.

5. To facilitate accounting of obligated funds, your travel claim should be submitted promptly.


27 Tr


(b) (6)

By direction


110


CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY.











PASSENGER MANIFEST—NONREVENUE					NAME OF CARRIER
MANIFEST NO.	MANIFEST DESTINATION	MANIFEST			CABIN ATTENDANT (if required)
		DESTINATION AIRPORT	STOWED BAGGAGE	PASSENGER WEIGHT PLUS CABIN BAGGAGE	
			PILOTS	WEIGHT	
U. S. ARMED FORCES PASSENGERS (Name, grade, and service No.)					ROUTINE
U. S. CIVILIANS AND FOREIGN NATIONALS (Name, title, nationality, age, sex, passport No.)					ROUTINE
(b) (6)		3	2	65	247
(b) (6)		3	2	64	200
(b) (6)		2	1	58	197
(b) (6)		3	1	48	130
(b) (6)		2	2	53	190
(b) (6)		5	1	22	122
(b) (6)		2	1	49	196
(b) (6)		3	1	40	170
(b) (6)		3	1	47	206
(b) (6)		3	1	58	235
(b) (6)		4	1	56	187
(b) (6)		2	1	47	190
(b) (6)		1	1	57	197
(b) (6)		3	0	0	183
(b) (6)		4	1	42	185
(b) (6)		4	1	56	267
(b) (6)		3	1	69	260
(b) (6)		2	1	55	197
(b) (6)		4	1	57	199
(b) (6)		3	1	54	187
(b) (6)		4	1	58	244
(b) (6)		3	1	59	183
(b) (6)		2	1	65	211
(b) (6)		3	2	57	250
(b) (6)		4	1	55	211
(b) (6)		3	1	50	206
(b) (6)		4	1	56	176
TOTAL					
TOTAL WEIGHT PASSENGERS AND ALL BAGGAGE					

PASSENGER MANIFEST—NONREVENUE

• 第六章 | 云原生微服务

第二輯 國際化事件

3. Mängijate läbirääkimine

A. TAKING A SIGHT-SEEING TOUR around

— 1 —

688

100-1000 nm

三、解决问题

卷之三

卷之三

100

1000

10

卷之三

10

1

THESE NAMES, GRAVES OR BURIALS ARE LISTED ON THIS MANIFEST HAVE BEEN

— 1 —

ANSWER

— 1 —


(b) (6)



THIS EXCERPT IS CIRCLED


11

THEIR FATHERS, GRANDFATHERS AND GREAT-GRANDFATHERS WERE BORN IN 1914

第二部分







1602-5 ATW DEP.
ATLANTIC DIVISION, MATS
APO 125, U.S.
AIR FORCE

1607 AM

Certified a True Copy
Major W. H. Green
Headquarters
Flight Test
Division
U.S. Air Force

1810 10 2031 160 15
1812 16 48N 10W 2036
1815 R 1200 00 2037
1818 R 1201 00 2038
1821 00 2039
1824 00 2040
1827 00 2041
1830 00 2042
1833 00 2043



Confined at Fort Leavenworth
for 18 months
and US Army
and US Marine Corps

10 OCT 19

1602-S ATW BTR.
ATLANTIC DIVISION, MATU
APO 125, U.S. AIR FORCE

WAIC TECHNICAL NOTE 57-21

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION OF A C-118 AIRCRAFT
MILITARY AIR TRANSPORT SERVICE
U.S. NAVY - BUAFR SERIAL NO. R6D-131-588

(b) (6) [REDACTED] 2ND LT., USAF
[REDACTED] AIRCRAFT LABORATORY
DIRECTORATE OF DEVELOPMENT

JANUARY 1957

117

WRIGHT AIR DEVELOPMENT CENTER

WADC TECHNICAL NOTE 57-21

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION OF A C-118 AIRCRAFT
MILITARY AIR TRANSPORT SERVICE
U.S. NAVY - BUAFR SERIAL NO. R6D-131-588

PREPARED BY
(b) (6) [REDACTED] 2ND LT, USAF
AIRCRAFT LABORATORY
DIRECTORATE OF DEVELOPMENT

JANUARY 1957

118

PROJECT 911A

WRIGHT AIR DEVELOPMENT CENTER
AIR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COMMAND
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WRIGHT-PATTERSON AIR FORCE BASE, OHIO

NOTICES

When Government drawings, specifications, or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related Government procurement operation, the United States Government thereby incurs no responsibility nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data, is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use, or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.

119

Copies of WADC Technical Reports and Technical Notes should not be returned to the Wright Air Development Center unless return is required by security considerations, contractual obligation, or notice on a specific document.

FOREWORD

This Technical Note was prepared by the Mechanical Branch of the Aircraft Laboratory as requested by Lt Col (b) (6) of the Air Research and Development Command Weapon System Project Office. Major contributions were made by the Rubber Section and Metals Branch of the Materials Laboratory and the Aircrew Effectiveness Branch of the Aero-Medical Laboratory.

This Technical Note is being prepared as a supplementary document to the accident report prepared at McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey. The accident investigating officer is Major (b) (6) Military Air Transport Service. The investigation was conducted under the general unsatisfactory report account 911A.

120

ABSTRACT

A left main landing gear and a twenty man life raft recovered from a crashed Military Air Transport Service R6D (C-118) aircraft was airlifted to the Wright Air Development Center on 26 October 1956. Members of the accident investigation board accompanying the equipment requested an analysis be made of the recovered parts. The final analysis indicates that the tire was exposed to flames and subsequently burned, the life raft was not exposed to flames, and the piston fracture was caused by an impact with the water in a direction parallel to the aircraft centerline. No evidence was found to indicate the cause of the accident.

2


121

PUBLICATION REVIEW

This Technical Note has been reviewed and is approved.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

(b) (6)



Chief, Mechanical Branch
Aircraft Laboratory

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

<u>Figure</u>		<u>Page</u>
1	C-118 Left Main Landing Gear	4
2	Hydraulic and Pneumatic Lines	5
3	Inboard Side of the Left Main Landing Gear	6
4	Charred Treads of Inboard Tire Left Main Landing Gear	7
5	Outboard Side of Right Tire Left Main Landing Gear	8
6	Charred Treads of Outboard Tire Left Main Landing Gear	9
7	Hydraulic Lines and Bracket	10
8	Fractured Piston Left Main Landing Gear	11

122

APPENDIX I

	<u>Page</u>
Excerpt from Test Report Submitted by of the Rubber Section of the Materials Laboratory . . . (b) (6)	14

APPENDIX II

Excerpt from Report Submitted by Major (b) (6) (b) of the Metals Branch of the Materials Laboratory . . .	16
--	----

Figure

1 Showing landing gear strut axle as received . . .	18
2 Showing fractured strut arrow (1) indicates rear half of circumference arrow (2) indicated direction of movement	19
3 Showing fractured area of strut. Arrow (1) indicates forward half of circumference arrow (2) indicates direction of motion	20
4 Showing section of aluminum tubing struck by heated object. Mag. 10X	21
5 Showing torque arm coupling pin with angle of bending. Arrow shows direction of bend	22
6 Showing portion of outer wheel of magnesium alloy cast wheel. Arrow shows enamel paint surface	23
7 Showing inside section of magnesium alloy cast wheel. Arrow indicates corrosion	24
8 Showing blistered paint on inner surface of wheel. Magnification 10X	25

APPENDIX III

Comments on Twenty Man Liferaft Recovered From Crashed R&D Aircraft - 10-1311 Prepared by Aero-Medical Laboratory	26
---	----

123

Figure

1	30
-------------	----

APPENDIX III

PageFigure

2	31
3	32
4	33
5	34
6	35
7	36
8	37
9	38
10	39
11	40
12	41
13	42
14	43
15	44

124

SECTION I

PURPOSE

To conduct an investigation of the recovered portion of a left main landing gear and a twenty man life raft from a R6D (C-118) aircraft (MATS - BUAFR Serial Number 131-588), which crashed during a flight from Lakenheath RAF Station, England to Laajes Field, USA, in an attempt to ascertain the cause of this accident.

SECTION II

125

FACTUAL DATA

On 26 October 1946 Major (b) USAF MATS accident investigation officer, Lt (b) USN MATS maintenance officer and Capt (b) USAF MATS pilot visited WALC. One purpose of the visit was to deliver a portion of a left main landing gear and a twenty man life raft, which were recovered by an English merchant ship and were positively identified as being part of the downed subject aircraft. This was reported as the only wreckage recovered. Major (b) requested that WADC make an investigation of these parts and try to determine any information which might be pertinent to the accident investigation.

Another purpose of the visiting McGuire Air Force Base personnel was to explain the circumstances surrounding the accident, this information follows.

At its last reporting location, the subject aircraft was approximately 180 miles from land end, flying at an altitude of 16,000 feet. The weather was reported broken to scattered and in general, relatively good flying conditions existed. Aircraft which flew roughly the same route as 131-588, both before and after disappearance, reported there were no adverse conditions encountered. The accident occurred at approximately 2000 hours, with darkness prevailing.

Manuscript released by the author 14 January 1957 for publication as a WADC Technical Note.

The left main landing gear received, consisted of both wheels and tires, and approximately 35 inches of the piston (the upper portion having been sheared off) (see Figure 1). The lower torque arm, noticeably bent, and hydraulic brake lines (see Figure 8) were still attached. The tires had approximately one-third of their surface area badly charred (see Figure 3 through 6). The magnesium wheels were badly corroded due to the longevity of exposures to sea water.

The aircraft gross weight, at take-off, was 99,942 pounds and tires were probably pressured to a standard 107,000 pounds gross weight condition. The aircraft had 5,800 hours of flying time and was 1200 hours out of IRAN. Take-off velocity was approximately 110 knots at 99,000 pounds at 1830 local time, with approximately 16,000 gallons of fuel aboard.

The Flight Handbook specified emergency procedure calls for lowering the landing gear to act as a drag gear and then retracting prior to initiation of ditching procedure. In case of electrical fire, the emergency power supplies energy only to the inverters. The first procedure is to shut off the electrical gang bar (electrical circuits). It is possible to lower and raise the gear, unless there is a hydraulic failure.

In initial investigations of the tires, several cuts were observed, one being approximately .375 inch wide and .500 inch deep (severing the first layer of tire cords) (see Figure 6, upper arrow). Several of these cuts are believed to have been present prior to the fire, others were probably inflicted in the process of removing the gear from the water. The large cut showed presence of metal and probably paint imbedded in the cut, however, the cut was probably inflicted prior to the burning of the tire surface, since the walls of the cut were charred. It was not possible to establish any positive cause for these cuts. 120

The lower fixture brackets (see Figure 7) were noticeably damaged. However, it is believed this damage was inflicted in removal from the ocean and subsequent handling during shipping.

The piston was checked for dimensional acceptability and was found satisfactory, except in the area of the crack (see Figure 8) where the piston was .099 inch out of round. Hydraulic fluid was not obtainable from the hydraulic lines. However, fluid was removed from the brake expander tubes. Analysis of this fluid showed no evidence of excessive heat. Water was found in the interior of the axle and was subsequently identified as sea water.

Grease removed from the cups was MIL-L-3545 and tests showed no evidence of the presence of excessive heat. Sand removed from the interior of the axle was analyzed and was identified as being of the type found on the coast of Spain and in the Riviera Area of France.

The metallic portion of the gear and the tires were sent to the Metals Branch and Rubber Branch of the Materials Laboratory for analysis. The findings of these branches and the analysis of the twenty man life raft are covered in the appendixes to this report.

127




Figure 1. C-118 Left Main Landing Gear

WADC TN 57-21

4

128




Figure 2. Hydraulic and Pneumatic Lines

WADC TN 57-21

5

129



Figure 3. Inboard Side of the Left Tire Left Main Landing Gear

WADG TB 57-21

6

130



Figure 4.

(b) (5)

Tire Left Main Landing Gear

44-0857-21

131



Figure 5. Outboard Side of Right Tire Left Main Landing Gear

WADC TN 57-21

8

132



Figure 6. (b) (5)

Tire Left Main Landing Gear

44-6 TN 57-21

9




Figure 7. Hydraulic Lines and Bracket

WADC TN 57-21

10

124



Figure 8. Fractured Piston Left Main Landing Gear

WADC TN 57-21

11

195

SECTION III

CONCLUSIONS

It is concluded that the affected portion of the subject landing gear tires and wheels was exposed to flames or hot gases, of a temperature of approximately 1100 - 1200°F., for a period of between 3-5 minutes. Further, that the tires were ignited and burned for a short period of time. It should be pointed out, that the tire burning may have been extinguished by cooler air, as well as by sea water. It is further concluded that this damage was incurred while the aircraft was in the air, as opposed to damage being inflicted by an ocean surface fire. However, there is insufficient evidence available to prove whether the gear was extended or retracted when the fire damage was inflicted. Two reasons for these conclusions are:

- a. The aluminum tubing (Figure 4 of Appendix II) showed evidence of being hit by a foreign object the temperature of which was approximately 1100 - 1200°F. The deformation and surface conditions present substantiate this fact. Further, the damage in the indentation of the tubing indicates the object was rapidly propelled against the tubing.
- b. The deterioration of the tire surface would indicate a strong movement or circulation of hot gases or air, of approximately 1000°F., over the effected tire surface. These conditions are highly unlikely to result from anything but an in-air fire.

There was definitely no evidence of fatigue in the area of the failed section of the piston or torque arms.

It could not be definitely concluded as to whether an in-air explosion occurred. It should, however, be noted that such an explosion was possible, but the only evidence of damage which would have resulted from an explosion was the damage inflicted to the aluminum tubing.

Indications are that the major fracture of the piston was caused by impact with the water, in a direction parallel to the aircraft fore-aft centerline. Further, the deformation of the torque arms would indicate an impact failure direction not parallel to the aircraft centerline. Therefore, it is concluded a double

gear water impact occurred, the first failing the torque arms and the second shearing the piston. This could indicate that the first impact occurred while the aircraft was in a small crab angle.

The inspection of the twenty man life raft revealed no evidence of burning and no evidence of any condition that would help in determining the cause of the accident.

137

APPENDIX I

The following information is an excerpt from the test report submitted by (b) (6) of the Rubber Section of the Materials Laboratory covering the analysis made of the recovered C-118 landing gear tires.

Tires were visually inspected in the Aircraft Laboratory. Pieces were cut from the damaged and from the undamaged portions of one of the tires and submitted to the Materials Laboratory for further test and inspection. The surface of the tires in the Aircraft Laboratory appeared to be charred or burned over a sector of about one-third of the circumference. The surface appeared stippled, not tacky, and free from loose charred material. The softening extended to a depth of about one-sixteenth inch, on the tread, tread grooves, and sidewalls. Corners of the tread grooves were rounded and damage was even over the tread and sidewalls of the affected sector with an absence of hot spots. The plies and inner surface of the tire showed no evidence of excessive heat.

Tests were conducted in an attempt to reproduce the damage. The tests were conducted on tread sections cut from the undamaged part of one tire, the sections being about four and one-half inches square. The first tests consisted of exposing the sections of tire to infra-red radiation supplied by heat lamps. The second series consisted of exposing the sections to hot air in an oven. In these tests, the sides and bottom of each section were insulated, exposing only the tread. For the third series, the tire sections were burned by squirting a stream of burning gasoline or toluene on the test section. An attempt was made to burn hydraulic oil, but it did not prove successful.

Results of the tests indicated that heat alone, while causing deterioration, did not produce the type of deterioration found on the damage tires. In the infra-red exposure, the test section surface became soft, and crazed but retained a firm "skin." The "skin" could be easily rubbed away, leaving a tarry surface which remained tarry upon exposure to air, (seven days). Likewise, specimens exposed to hot air in an oven became softened and wrinkled, but retained a firm skin. The test pieces squirted with burning gasoline, however, developed a stippled, charred surface in those areas where the rubber itself was ignited. In the area where the rubber burned for about two minutes, damage was approximately one-sixteenth inch deep, the same depth as on the damaged tires. The burning of the rubber was not well established at this point (two or three minutes) and could be blown out when the gasoline or toluene spray was stopped. Longer burning of the rubber caused pitting and softening of the tread.

The actual test procedures were as follows:

The infra-red test apparatus consisted of four 250w infra-red lamps arranged about eight inches from the test specimens. Direct measurement of the surface temperature was not possible with equipment at hand. A sheet of rubber about 0.07 inch thick was measured on the side away from the infra-red radiation, the indicated temperature being 560°F after 10 minutes. Both the thin sheets and the tire sections began smoking 30 seconds after the lamps were turned on indicating high surface temperatures. The oven tests were conducted in a non-circulating electric oven, at temperatures of 700°, 750°, and 800°F. The test sections were insulated on the sides and bottom with layers of asbestos paper, exposing only the tread to the hot air. Exposures were made for 5, 7 1/2, and 10 minutes. The specimen exposed 10 minutes at 800°F burned vigorously. None of the others, however, became ignited.

Several test sections were burned by squirting them with a syringe, using burning toluene or gasoline. Hydraulic oil at room temperature was also tried, but did not ignite. The burning fuel, itself, did little damage to the rubber, but did ignite the rubber in small areas without excessively heating the entire test section. It was these areas that most closely simulated the damaged tires.

Tread depth of the tires in the Aircraft Laboratory were as follows. Measurement was at the tread rib next to a shoulder:

Tire A		Tire B (sample taken from this tire)	
Tread Depth		Tread Depth	
Undamaged sector	Damaged sector	Undamaged sector	Damaged sector
0.44"	0.40"	0.39"	0.34"

The conclusion reached is that the damaged tires appeared to have been exposed to high temperature air or fire near 1000°F, for a short period of time, during which the tire burned. The period of burning appears to have been short, about 2 to 5 minutes. It would seem that the presence of fuel and/or hydraulic fluid would considerably contribute to the damage of this tire.

APPENDIX II

The following information is an excerpt from a report submitted by Major (b) (6) of the Metals Branch of the Materials Laboratory, covering the analysis of metallic portions of the recovered C-118 landing gear.

The lower attachment of the right main landing gear shock strut of a C-118 aircraft failed while ditching the aircraft. The gear was made of 4340 steel, chrome plated, heat treated to 180,000 - 200,000 psi strength. The part was manufactured by the Cleveland Pneumatic Tool Company.

The failure occurred near the top of the strut. Figure 1 shows the right main landing gear shock strut and axle in the as received condition. Examination of the failed area of the strut shows the shear type failure. Metal flow was shown on the inner lip of one side and the outer lip of the opposite side of the fracture. The forward side of the fractured area was rounded indicating a rubbing action after fracture. (see Figure 2 and 3). The diameter of the strut, at the point of failure, along the longitudinal axes measures 11/16 inch less than the horizontal diameter in the same area. The torque arm pin and the lower half of the torque arm were bent 15° away from the horizontal axes (see Figure 5). The amount of twisting or turning in the area of the fracture was negligible. The chrome plated strut was covered with a grayish residue which scrapped off easily leaving the chromed surface unmarred. Visual examination further revealed evidence of fire damage as evidenced by blistered, dis-colored paint.

Paint samples were taken from areas not affected by fire in order to reproduce the color and other physical appearances of the fire damaged painted surfaces. The conditions of the fired damaged paint were reproduced at 550°.

Chemical analysis of the scrappings found on the chrome plated strut showed the following amounts of metallic elements:

- a. Principal - Calcium
- b. Major - Magnesium, Iron
- c. Minor - Chromium, Aluminum

140

d. Trace - Silicon, Boron, Lead, Manganese, Antimony, Tin, Cadmium, Copper, Nickel

X-Ray diffraction study established the identity of the compound as principally Ca CO₃, in the form of Aragonite.

Metallographic examination of the magnesium alloy cast wheel, did not show any evidence of change of grain structure due to exposure to heat. (Figure 6, 7 and 8 show conditions of the magnesium cast wheel.) A length of aluminum tubing which appeared to have been struck by a hot object was examined microscopically, but no evidence of change of the surface due to heat exposure was found (see Figure 4).

The conclusions reached were:

The nature of the fracture indicates that the landing gear failed in shear as a result of overload created on impact.

The parts were subjected to fire and were exposed to temperatures in range of 500°F. The parts were not exposed to temperatures high enough over a period of time sufficient to cause any change in the grain structure of either the magnesium alloy or the steel alloy.

The fact that the diameter of the strut in the area of the fracture is 11/16 inch less along the longitudinal axes than the diameter along the horizontal is a positive indication that the impact occurred along the longitudinal axes and caused the shear fracture.

141

WAUG IN 57-21

18





Figure 1. Showing landing gear strut and axle as received.

4

5





5

6

7

54



(b) (5)

Figure 4.


Mag. 10X

WAUC TN 57-21

21


MAC IN 57-21

22



(b) (5)

Figure 5.



WALK TN 57-21

23



Figure 6. Showing portion of outer wheel of magnesium alloy cast wheel.

(b) (5)

(b) (5)



(b) (5)

Figure 7. Showing inside section of magnesium alloy cast wheel.



Figure 5. (b) (5)

Magnification 10X.

WALKE M 57-21

25

149

APPENDIX III

COMMENTS ON TWENTY MAN LIFERAFT

RECOVERED FROM CRASHED R6D

AIRCRAFT - 10-1311

150

PREPARED BY

AERO-MEDICAL LABORATORY
WRIGHT AIR DEVELOPMENT CENTER
WRIGHT-PATTERSON AIR FORCE BASE, OHIO

APPENDIX III

COMMENTS ON TWENTY MAN LIFERAFT

RECOVERED FROM CRASHED R6D

AIRCRAFT - 10-1311

150

PREPARED BY

AERO-MEDICAL LABORATORY
WRIGHT AIR DEVELOPMENT CENTER
WRIGHT-PATTERSON AIR FORCE BASE, OHIO

Comments on Photographs
of
20-Man Raft from R6D Aircraft HUAER No. 131-588

- | <u>Figure No.</u> | <u>Comments</u> |
|-------------------|---|
| 1. | This photograph provides an overall view of one side of the raft. Note concentration of marks on the raft floor. |
| 2. | This photograph is of the opposite side of the raft. An analysis of the dark markings on the floor revealed the markings were largely dirt mixed with calcium carbonate. |
| 3. | This view of the cylinder area of the raft reveals that the raft had been inspected and repaired, probably twice, prior to installation in the aircraft. Note the four patches of two different materials. The cover required for the cylinder was missing. So was the lacing for the cylinder pocket. If a cover was installed when the raft was packaged, it is difficult to visualize both the cover and the lacing being lost while the raft was in the water. The release cable used to actuate the cylinder valve was missing and the cylinder had been discharged. The cylinder contained approximately 3 pounds of water. The water entered the cylinder through a break in the nipple of the "Y" fitting used to connect the cylinder valve to the inlet checks on the raft. It is possible the cord to the release cable may have caught on some part of the aircraft and actuated the cylinder valve. Other points to note are the heaving line around the cylinder valve and the hole in the raft tube. |
| 4. | This view is to show the damaged bulkhead and damage to the tube on each side of the bulkhead at one of the boarding stations. When the 20-man raft is confined in a small space then inflated, the raft tube will burst either near the cylinder (Figure 3) or at a bulkhead. It appears here that both tubes were inflated and that one burst near the cylinder (see Figure 3) and the other tube burst at the bulkhead. |

Normally, the tube would not burst on each side of a bulkhead. If the bulkhead failed, as shown here, pressure then could build up in the boarding station and cause a rupture on each side of the bulkhead. This would happen if the gas could not flow around the tube in the opposite direction.

5. The hole in the boarding stirrup and the small nylon cord are of interest in this view. The hole in the stirrup can not be visualized as a result of the raft being in the water. Whatever caused the hole in the stirrup may be responsible for the adjacent holes in the raft tube.
6. Note the design of the raft floor. The identity is unknown. The shape does not appear to be that of a heel print. (See Figure 8). The second arrow was placed to show the cleaner area of the raft floor.
7. The two pieces of frayed cord are directly opposite the raft cylinder and are in the position of the cord of the heaving line to which the cords are attached is taut at the tube sections on each side. This indicates the cords were under tension. It is doubtful that the tension was enough to snap the cords since the patches for the life line were not damaged.
8. This photograph shows the name (Patten Company) of the manufacturer of the raft, an unidentified design, and two heel prints. Since the prints are on the tube, it is evident the tube has been walked on while in the deflated condition.
9. The patch on the raft tube denotes inspection and repair of the raft prior to the accident. The equalizer cleamps and pockets were missing on both sides of the floor.
10. This photograph identifies the raft as a Type F-2A 20-man raft. Since the Patten Company has not been known to supply rafts under Specification MIL-R-9131A, it is believed that rafts

were supplied under Specification MIL-R-6680A and Contract N383s-75655. Rafts under this contract were first delivered to the Air Force during the latter part of 1952.

11. This is a view of a deflated boarding station and one of the two deflated floor supports. The tube of the other boarding station was damaged. Under normal conditions, the station and support would show evidence of having been inflated if the raft had been occupied for any length of time.
12. &
13. These views are intended to show orange colored spots on the raft tube and floor. Similar spots were found on the raft tube near the cylinder valve. The spots were determined to be largely rust. The spots were attributed to leakage of rust laden water from the cylinder.
14. The frayed nylon cord is believed to be the cord used in trying the J-1 marker lamp to the raft.
15. None of the inflation valves in the floor of the raft were covered by the protective flap. The hole in the access sleeve and the hole in the raft tube were probably caused by the metal plug of the inflation valve.




Figure 1

30

WADC TN 57-21

54




31

WADC TN 57-21

Figure 2

155

WT CHIN 16
WT CHIN 2 H. 10 LBS
TOTAL WT HAN 26.5 LBS
FLEXIBL SYRINGE
MANUFACTURER
U.S. PLASTIC CO.



33

WADC TN 57-21






Figure 5



34

WADC TN 57-24

158



WADC TN 57-21

36





Figure 7




WADC TN 57-21

38



Figure 10



39

T2-L5 N1

763

WALC TN 57-21

40



Figure 11

WADC TN 57-21

42



Figure 12

27

PLATE NO 57-22



TP-15 NO. 007A



44

WADIC TN 57-21




Figure 15